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ABSTRACT 
 
MCNAMEE, ABIGAIL    Combatting Cultures of Impunity After Insurgent Violence:  
Case Studies on Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Peru. Department of Political Science, 
June 2015. 
 
 ADVISOR: Thomas Lobe 
 
 Directly contrasting interstate warfare, intrastate violence comprises of violence in an 
individual state, typically between an opposition of anti-state actors versus the state and its 
coercive forces. This project particularly examines recent insurgent groups in opposition to the 
state. These conflicts, rooted in deep embitterment, are often regarded as enduring, lasting 
several years before cessation. This thesis considers both the legitimate grievances the anti-state 
insurgency experienced prior to the conflict, as well as the legitimate counterinsurgency 
initiative the state used to protect its monopoly of violence. These internal conflicts result in 
countless non-combatant causalities and human rights violations, creating “wounds” for 
survivors. Whether the conflict ends in peace agreement or military victory, nation-states need to 
determine how to deal with these imposing wounds. Once the conflict ends, the tendency of the 
state to give impunity to various state actors, remaining issues of human rights, and 
accountability for unjustified killings are all explored. The last section explores how transitional 
justice measures can potentially heal these wounds from conflict.  
Case studies on the insurgency movements of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
(CPN-M) against Nepal, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against Sri Lanka, and 
the Shining Path (PCP-SL) against Peru, follow the chapters, offering concrete examples of the 
experience particular states have had, both during conflict and in post-conflict, analyzing the 
complexities and varying issues that result. 
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Introduction 
 
“War is hell,” Michael Walzer declares in Just and Unjust Wars. 1 War undoubtedly is 
hell: it destroys societies with unforgiving force, potentially resulting in the deaths of tens of 
thousands including innocent civilians, and displaces even more from their homes. In Syria 
alone, 3.8 million are currently displaced in neighboring countries like Jordan and Lebanon, 
unable to return to their own country, compromising the largest refugee crisis to date.2 Though 
war is hell, it is something that is not going away anytime soon, especially in the twenty first 
century as unpredictable threats constantly rise. Headlines in the news and in social media 
constantly stream into homes, shocking individuals with atrocities such as another suicide bomb 
attack in Afghanistan, the recent events in Ukraine, the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, Nigeria’s Boka Horam’s massive kidnapping of Nigerian school girls in summer 2014, 
or yet another beheading video produced by ISIL.  
War and mass killings have plagued the twentieth century between the two World Wars, 
several genocides, and the Cold War. Though many regard the twentieth century as being 
“bloodiest century” yet, war has always composed an intrinsic role in human societies, with 
evidence spanning back centuries. War can be defined as, “an act of force by an organized social 
power to compel an enemy to submit to its will.”3 By definition, war needs to be between at least 
two collective actors. Interstate conflict, or war between states, is “the ultimate way in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 
2006), 22.  
2 Chris Huber and Kathyrn Reid, “FAQs: War in Syria, Children, and the Refugee Crisis,” World  
Vision, last modified Jan 14, 2015, http://www.worldvision.org/news-stories-videos/faqs-war-syria-children-and-
refugee-crisis. 
3 Martin Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in 
association with Blackwell), 18.	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power relations are tested by, and conflicts resolved between, state-like collective actors.”4  
Realist thinkers in International Relations always have perceived war to be a fundamentally 
natural characteristic of societies due to the concept of anarchy. Since states are products of an 
anarchic society with no higher power above them, they are constantly in competition with each 
other, fighting to rise as the regional hegemon. War has allowed states to secure this overarching 
power, and it is evident that it will remain with us. 
 Shifting away from realist thinking, it is evident that the conventional ways we perceive 
war is dramatically changing, in many ways for the better, and in some situations for the worst. 
Instead of engaging in wars to gain power, increasingly wars are fought for violations of 
international law, directly contrasting with realism and anarchy beliefs. No longer are wars 
ending with a clear “winner” with a dramatic victory on the battlefield. Instead, there has been an 
increase of truces and peace agreements to mediate differences instead of engaging in further 
combat, signifying that ultimately peace is valued overall. Additionally, the way countries think 
about the necessity of war is changing. Before World War I, prior attitudes in Europe, “saw war 
as inevitable, as beneficial to the winners, something ‘to be welcomed, not avoided..., a 
philosophical and moral good.’”5 Progressively, throughout the past couple centuries, fewer 
countries have justified military intervention in other countries unless driven by a rational 
explanation (however, this does not account for a number of current interventions). 
World War II especially fueled the disenchantment behind the common practice of 
resorting to war. At the end of the war, the world was shocked of the destruction that humans 
could potentially inflict against one another, and promised to prevent this from happening ever 
again. Immediately following the end of World War II, the United Nations (UN) created the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., 63.  
5 Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (New York: Dutton, 
2011), 224. 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The purpose behind the document remains as a 
standard definition of human rights for the international community, establishing a necessary 
foundation. The UDHR asserts that all citizens of the world have equal and unalienable rights. 
Based on these rights, the international community should protect these rights and ensure justice 
and peace for all.6 Several subsequent bodies have emerged since ensuring that the UDHR works 
as a force to protect all global citizens from human rights violations. After the effective 
formulation of the UDHR, binding international treaties to uphold these values were established 
since the UDHR does not possess binding mechanisms within the document itself.7  
While some consider that UDHR has become part of customary international law, the 
UDHR ultimately is a UN General Assembly resolution, not a treaty, therefore not binding. In 
addition to the UDHR, the international community has developed numerous treaties and 
additional international law standards including, but not limited to, human rights law and 
humanitarian law. Human rights law and humanitarian law are both separate legal instruments 
but also interrelate together working to make war crimes illegal. Both institutions of law contain 
language forbidding torture, genocide, slavery, and extra-judicial killings. However, these laws 
are not necessarily effective, even if states sign them. Signing a treaty is simply a declaration, not 
a guarantee. Treaties only officially become bound when a “treaty has been ratified or acceded to 
according to the constitutional procedures of that country.”8 Scholars have explored potential 
explanations behind the phenomenon of why states ignore their obligations to protect human 
rights despite signing these treaties. Essentially, states will willingly condemn other countries for 
their human rights violations, but hesitate when others object their own practices. For example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2007), 5. 
7  Susan Waltz, “Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of the Universal Declaration of Human  
Rights,” Third World Quarterly 23 (2002): 437, accessed December 16, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/-3993535 
8 Donnelly, International Human Rights, 5.  
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this occurs with the United States even though the United States largely supported the 
establishment these binding instructions. By not ratifying these documents, the U.S. avoids any 
accountability of potential prosecution for its torture practices in Guantanamo. Oona A. 
Hathaway suggests that states with poor human rights records will willingly sign off on treaties 
since they possess an extremely small prospect for complying with these treaties.9 When they 
sign, enforcement is not guaranteed as they can postpone actual reinforcement by not making 
efforts to put these treaties into legislation in their respective states.  
 The dynamics of war are certainly changing with time. At the moment, there is a 
complete absence of direct interstate war, or war between two states. Goldstein celebrates 
stating, “Taking interstate wars off the table has rid us, for the most part, of large battles with 
heavy weapons such as tanks and artillery, which are hugely lethal and destructive.”10As the 
immediate threat of interstate conflict fades away, it is increasingly apparent that “all armed 
conflicts in the world today are civil wars. In each of them a government is fighting against 
insurgent forces, which often operate out of uniform and do not follow the laws of war.”11 
Because of these conditions, significant attention needs to shift towards internal conflicts, as they 
are increasingly more likely to proliferate in global politics. 
 Intrastate conflicts have manifested in a variety of forms, but always comprise a conflict 
between two or more armed forces. By nature, these conflicts are extremely asymmetrical in 
nature in that the government and insurgents bring varying levels of force against one another, 
with one side (usually the state and it’s forces) being significantly stronger. Asymmetrical 
conflict contrasts directly with symmetrical warfare in that interstate conflict operates as “classic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Oona A. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
51 (2007): 590, accessed December 16, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27638567.  
10 Goldstein, 276. 
11 Ibid., 279. 	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armed conflict between States of roughly equal military strength.”12 By contrast, the “inequality 
between the belligerents and their weaponry is the rule rather than the exception” in 
asymmetrical warfare.13 While two sides are present, internal wars can become more degenerate 
in nature with civilians being explicitly targeted as an enemy. Genocide represents a prime 
extreme of degenerate war where it is a “conflict between organized armed forces, on the one 
hand, and civilian populations that are largely unarmed on the other.”14 Since the Holocaust, 
genocides have surfaced in Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and other countries.  
Though not as on massive of a scale as interstate war, internal conflict also comprises of 
situations of grave human rights violations and atrocities. For these individuals living in internal 
conflict, the threat of war is extremely pressing. Mary Griffin of International of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) accounts, “Internal armed conflicts have been the predominant and the most brutal type 
of conflict over the past 50 years. They have been the forum for the most flagrant and 
widespread human rights abuses and where the tragic consequences of impunity have been most 
clearly in evidence.”15 Since intrastate conflicts occur in sovereign, independent states, the 
international community has considerably less authority in challenging prevailing impunity in 
states that committed atrocities during intrastate conflict. Essentially, combatting impunity 
resides with the state itself. However, the international community has ruthlessly campaigned to 
extend human rights responsibilities to war crimes occurring during internal conflict as the ICRC 
reiterates, “It is now evident that customary law imposes individual criminal responsibility for all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Toni Pfanner, “Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action,” 
International Review of the Red Cross 87 (2005): 152, accessed February 10, 2015, https://www.icrc.org/-
eng/assets/files/other/irrc_857_pfanner.pdf 
13 Ibid., 152-153.  
14 Shaw, 46. 
15 Mary Griffin, “Ending the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Atrocities: A Major Challenge for 
International Law in the 21st Century,” International Review of the Red Cross 838 (2000): accessed October 24, 
2014, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqhj.htm 
6	  	  
violations committed in internal armed conflicts.”16 However, actually enforcing these 
mechanisms has been challenging.  
This thesis particularly addresses themes of impunity and the direct challenges states face 
when transitioning to a more peaceful society post-conflict. In interstate war, enemies will never 
necessarily face each other after combat. But what happens when your enemy lives next door? A 
strange phenomenon in intrastate war is that it positions families and friends directly against each 
other. Post-conflict, these former enemies must learn to live again in a state amongst individuals 
who potentially could have done them wrong. The most poignant recent example being in 
Rwanda, where Tutsis may be forced to see everyday the individual who may have murdered 
their whole family. 
Straying away from interstate conflict, the rest of this project exclusively focuses on 
intrastate conflict, centering in on conflicts that sprouts from the rise of insurgency groups. The 
first chapter pays special attention to the roots of conflict itself and the potential conditions 
which inspire an insurgency, the second focuses on a state’s general counterinsurgency plan and 
the issues of impunity which develop within that plan, while the third chapter explores what 
transpires post-conflict and the limitations of exploring truth, justice, and memory. 
Accompanying these chapters are concrete examples with case studies on Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, and Peru, who all recently experienced violent intrastate conflicts. All these cases saw 
insurgencies rise against the state. The insurgencies in examination are: the People’s Liberation 
Army of the Communist Party of Nepal (PLA-CPN), the Partido Comunista de Peru-Sendero 
Luminoso or the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (PCP-SL), and finally the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While these case studies are not entirely analogous, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Mary Griffin, “Ending the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Atrocities.”  
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accurately represent conditions of a) how insurgent groups can rise within a state due to 
legitimate grievances, b) how the state responded to the threat of the insurgent group, and c) 
what specific measures or lack thereof the state utilized to provide accountability for any 
breaches in international human rights standards. While not all conflicts are similar as the case 
studies, they all possess intersecting characteristics. We certainly can learn from these lessons. In 
particular, we can begin to comprehend how human rights violations can be confronted in our 
world today. Much can be discerned from the ways states respond to these threats and resultantly 
how states actively disregard accountability for human rights violations amidst a persistent 
international community that is increasingly encouraging a newfound respect for human rights.  
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Chapter One: Roots of Internal Conflict 
 
 Conflict is inevitable. Territory Disputes, contrary notions of leadership, differences of taste— 
in the world in which we live conflict, whether it is on the job, in the home, or on the 
international horizon, will always make up a part of our landscape.17 
        -Catherine Claire Larson 
 
 As Larson claims, conflict certainly is inevitable. It permeates whenever conflicting 
opinions surface. States are especially conducive to conflict since multiple groups of varying 
ethnicities, religions, all coexist within a state’s borders. Political scientists commonly define 
conflict as, “competition among groups for power, resources, opportunities, status, or respect, 
competition that is usually pursued and adjusted by peaceful means, but may under some 
circumstances turn violent.”18 While conflict is inevitable in states, there are certain situations 
where it can escalate into violence and other situations where discrepancies remain at bay. In 
accordance with this definition of conflict by political scientists, this chapter specifically 
examines how competition can escalate into a violent situation in states with insurgency 
movements. These insurgency movements represent non-state actors vying for their own 
interests and concerns.  
 
Statehood vs. Nationhood  
 Before tackling the components behind internal conflict, it is critical to distinguish 
statehood in order to conceptualize how some states end up experiencing insurgent based 
violence whereas others do not. For example, states such as Canada and Norway have never been 
challenged by rebel insurgencies whereas countries such as Ireland and Indonesia have been 
forced to battle extremely violent and ruthless insurgent groups for years. For some reason, these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Catherine C. Larson, As We Forgive: Stories of Reconciliation from Rwanda, (Grand Rapids, Mich: Zondervan, 
2009), 51. 18	  Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective, (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 7. 
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insurgent groups rise and reach the point of willingly utilizing violence against innocent civilians 
for their own distinctive political motivations. Understanding the characteristics behind the 
composition of a state is crucial before beginning to comprehend how conflict erupts between 
these non-state actors and a state and its agents.  
A state is a collective governing an established territory with specific borders. In order to 
be considered a “healthy” state, a state needs to possess fundamental characteristics. Such 
characteristics include: a defined territorial base, a semi-functioning government, a sound 
population, and recognition from the international community as a state such as bodies like the 
UN.19 Traditionally, a state has taxes, state officials, set laws, a currency, a postal service, a 
police force, and some form of a military, or means of protection. With these systems in place, 
states have the ability to regulate the affairs of the state, enforce taxes, wage war against other 
states, imprison civilians, and more. All these functions contribute to a state’s sovereignty, which 
prevents other states from interfering with a state’s inherent right to rule over its territory.20 
While the terms “state” and “nation” often are used interchangeably, the two terms do not always 
have the same definition.  
In contrast, nations are “groups of people claiming common bonds like language, culture, 
and historical identity.”21 These groups of people share these common characteristics, unifying 
them together under a collective identity. Nations can have specific territory set aside which the 
group identifies with, but not necessarily have its own established statehood. Some nations have 
sovereignty and rule states such as the French, Egyptians, Germans, and Japanese. Other groups 
of nationalities do not enjoy this same entitlement to their territory, as their nationalities do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 James A. Paul, “Nations and States,” last modified January 19, 2001, https://www.globalpolicy.org-
/component/content/article/172/30345.html 
20 Ibid.  
21	  Ibid.  
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align with the rest of the state’s population. For instance both Tibetans and Palestinians represent 
“nations” struggling to have jurisdiction over the land in which they reside. The Kurds in the 
Middle East serve as a unique situation where its large diaspora resides in multiple states, 
potentially threatening those nationalities that govern the states they live in. In regards to the 
future case study in this project, the Tamils in Sri Lanka represent this issue. The Tamil Tigers 
rose as an insurgency group with the goal of having their own autonomy, eventually deciding to 
secede from the rest of Sri Lanka. The Tamil struggle directly coincides with the concept of the 
nation-state as they desire the right to have national self-determination. Instead of identifying 
with the Sinhalese majority, the Tamils wish to control their own livelihood. They identify more 
with the ethnonational roots over the state.   
Ethnonational roots can potentially spur distinctly ethnonational movements. These 
movements occur after “Having experienced discrimination or persecution, many of these groups 
are now taking collective action in support of national self-determination.”22 One major example 
concerns the Kashmiris living in India, which has led to extreme tensions between the relations 
between India and Pakistan. Hindus rule the overwhelmingly Muslim Kashmiris in India, 
creating disparity, as the Kashmiris largely do not identify with the ruling government’s 
principles.23 Ethnonational movements do not always stem from a collective religion, and could 
instead be class based, race based, or ideologically based. Another distinction is that not all 
ethnonationalists desire their own territory.24 They may wish for a simple recognition of their 
status, they may want the government to make specific accommodations in the constitution, or 
too, they may desire certain services. Since nationalities come with their own specific interests or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “The State,” accessed October 24, 2014, http://www.wwnorton.com/college-/polisci/essentialsof-international-
relations5/ch/05/summary.aspx 
23 “The State.”  
24 Ibid. 	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goals, differing opinions are bound to arise causing tension when various groups live with each 
other in the same territory. 
Ethnic conflict erupts when these tensions become hostile. Ethnic conflict itself possesses 
inherent differences from other forms of conflict. Stefan Wolff in Ethnic Conflict: A Global 
Perspective, asserts that in order to make a conflict ethnic, “the goals of at least one conflict 
party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of 
confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions.”25 Therefore, both groups do not need to be fighting 
for ethnic purposes. One group could fight another for the purpose of eliminating the other as a 
way to control a specific area, or a group could fight for more autonomy as discussed previously. 
Ethnic conflict develops with ethnic pluralism.26 Ethnic pluralism occurs when more than one 
ethnic community is in a political space. Milton Esman in An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict, 
claims, “When ethnic communities encounter one another, their contact provides the necessary 
condition for conflict.”27 One side will feel the pressure to control the territory, especially in the 
event where one ethnicity dominates the political sphere. However, even if the necessary 
components of violence conflict exist, it does not guarantee that conflict will erupt.   
The unfixed nature of boundaries in states offers an explanation to why all these differing 
nationalities exist within in the same territory. 28 Contrary to first assumption, it would appear as 
if boundaries are fixed and unchanging. However, quite the opposite is true. James A. Paul 
accounts, “State boundaries are arbitrary and often changed—by war, negotiation, arbitration, 
and even by sale of territory for money.”29 The disagreement between Chile and Argentina over 
the borderlines in Patagonia represents one example. Another being after Yugoslavia collapsed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Woolf, Ethnic Conflict, 2. 
26 Milton J. Esman, An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict, (Oxford Malden, MA, USA: Polity, 2004), 1. 
27 Woolf, Ethnic Conflict, 4. 
28 Paul, “Nations and States.”  
29 Ibid. 	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unsettled borders resulted in extreme competition of who possessed sovereignty over the land.30 
These are just some examples of the countless situations where defined states have fluctuated 
over the years.  
 One way to shed light on the situation of fluctuating states is by examining the way the 
United Nations (UN) has grown in membership since 1945. Since its conception, the UN has 
experienced extreme growth. When world powers founded the United Nations on October 24th 
1945, it composed of just 51 member states.31 Since its conception, 143 member states have 
joined the United Nations, amounting to a total of 193 nations.32 The nations allowed 
membership must be, according to the United Nations Charter, “peace-loving states which accept 
the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are 
able and willing to carry out these obligations.”33 According to this definition, these numbers do 
not account for other states within the international community for just being an entity does not 
mean it can be formally recognized as an independent state, such as Taiwan. Despite these 
restrictions, it remains evident that over the past couple of decades, there has been an increase in 
fragmenting states. The high numbers of states joining the UN are composed of many small 
states, often from fragmenting former nation-states. The international community has witnessed 
escalating periods of new statehood especially in the 1990s. The phenomenon of fragmenting 
states originates from a variety of sources, such as the de-colonization and dissolving of former 
countries from prior wars. 
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 After World War II, former colonial powers increasingly gave up their colonial power in 
the late 1950s to 1960s.34 Resultantly, new sovereign states entered the political sphere, gaining 
independence. A peak of decolonization occurred in 1960 when eighteen former African 
colonies gained independence.35 Algeria offers an example of a former colony that struggled 
intensely for its independence until 1962. In addition to decolonization, the breakup of the Soviet 
Union sprouted fourteen new independent states in the early 1990s.36 The civilians, once 
declaring allegiance to the Soviet Union, now were directed to declare allegiance to their 
respective countries instead. Feelings of nationalism to Poland, Croatia, and Moldova replaced 
communism.37 The inherent problem with these new states is that guaranteed allegiance does not 
necessarily follow with the creation of the state. Furthermore, a creation of a state does not 
ensure that all living within the borders will necessarily identify with the same nation per se. A 
surplus of varying nationalities can coexist within the new border, sprouting discontent. The 
breakup of Yugoslavia represents the disunity issues when varying ethnic groups comprise the 
state.38 After World War I, Yugoslavia was created as one entity to unify the Slavic groups over 
creating several small states. Issues soon became apparent since in the little over one million 
population, six nationalities were present.39 The problems in Yugoslavia’s situation represent the 
extreme difficulties with unifying peoples in these new states.  
Besides varying groups of differing ethnicities and nationalities, other issues arise with 
these new states. Weak statehood, or poorly governable situations make it arduous for 	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governments to maintain control. John Mueller attributes decolonization with unleashing a 
stream of poorly governable states. He states, “With the decolonization of the late 1950s and 
1960s, a group of poorly governed societies came into being, and many found themselves having 
to deal with civil warfare.”40 These poorly governed states also needed to deal with their former 
colonial powers in the aftermath of the Cold War backing out of financial assistance.41 Such was 
the case of France, which gave far less assistance to its former colonies in Africa, sprouting 
issues financially and leaving the governments unable to police their citizens effectively. As 
previously mentioned, the post-Cold War period saw “an increase in the number of incompetent 
governments, as weak, confused, ill-directed, and sometimes criminal governments emerged in 
many of the post-Communist countries, replacing comparatively competent police states.”42 
These poorly governed states became conducive to extreme disorder. The combination of 
dissatisfied people living in poor conditions and an inadequate government in control makes it 
more likely for conflict to erupt within the state.  
 Conflict can erupt within the state when governments lose control of the fundamental 
conditions of statehood as previously defined. In contrast, more adequate governments, or those 
who have control over their main responsibilities are less likely to experience violence. Mueller 
testifies, “Civil wars are least likely to occur in stable democracies and in stable autocracies—
that is, in countries with effective governments and policing forces.”43 These stable governments 
are able to control the discontent effectively.  However, states that do not have effective 
governments or working policing forces that are able to control the population have extreme 
difficulty balancing unrest in their territory. Political Scientists classify these states as “failed 
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states.” A state can reach this point when, “it is no longer able to provide the services for which 
it exists.”44 When states experience difficulty maintaining order and legitimacy, it creates the 
potential of an eruption of civil war. Mueller states, “many civil wars have effectively been 
caused by inept governments, which tend to apply excessive and indiscriminate force to try to 
deal with relatively small bands of troublemakers, often turning friendly or indifferent subjects 
into hostile ones.”45  
The case studies examined in this thesis all come from countries who had disparities in 
the population. They did not necessarily have all the components of a healthy state. However, 
these states were not unique in experiencing conflict as intrastate conflicts have been on the rise.  
 
Rise of Intrastate Conflict 
Individual states throughout the world, have been experiencing an influx of conflict 
according to Brendan O’Leary and John Tirman.46  This influx of conflict shifts away from the 
predominance of interstate conflict as established in the introduction, as Christian Davenport and 
Scott Gates claim interstate conflicts are on the decline, while intrastate violence situations are 
increasingly growing.47 John Mueller also indicates that since the end of World War II, the most 
common wars sprouting have been those of civil wars within a singular state.48 He establishes, 
“Most civil wars have taken place in the poorest countries of the world, and many have been 
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labeled ‘new war,’ ‘ethnic conflict,’ or, most grandly, ‘clashes of civilizations’.”49 Yet, there are 
inherent problems with simplifying civil conflicts in this nature. The conditions are far more 
complex in reality and not all can be simplified to these classifications, or just one explanation. 
While intrastate conflict, or internal struggles within a state, currently originates most violent 
conflicts in the world, the subject is far less researched than interstate conflict. 50  
Even though significant more literature on interstate conflict exists, social scientists 
currently are compiling together a field of work stressing the importance of studying intrastate 
violence. Intrastate conflict holds a rising prevalence due to there being a peak of civil wars in 
the international political sphere. 1994 marks the year of highest peak of internal wars, as 44 
unresolved civil wars were going on.51  
It appears as if these conflicts are a new phenomenon in post-Cold War politics since the 
Cold War dominated international politics for 45 years. Additionally, some may believe that 
there is a rise of intrastate conflicts over interstate conflicts because of a high number of new 
conflicts emerging. But significant literature suggests quite the opposite. James Fearon and 
David D. Laitin propose, “the prevalence of civil wars in the post-Cold War is not due to effects 
of the end of the Cold War. Nor is it the result of civil wars breaking out a steadily increasing 
rate over the period.”52 While various conflicts erupted after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
many of the seeds of these conflicts were rooted far before the Soviet Union collapsed. 
Therefore, these conflicts cannot be explained simply because of being a by-product of the Cold 
War. Another key point for context is with the end of the Cold War in 1991, many of the civil 
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wars inspired by the Cold War also ended within states.53 Mueller accounts, “Although the end of 
the Cold War tended to increase the problem of civil wars… lingering ideological civil wars 
inspired or enhanced by the Cold War contest died out (or became transmogrified into criminal 
ones) with its demise.”54 While a few conflicts arose in the early 1990s in international politics as 
a result of the Soviet Union, it does not explain the phenomenon as a whole. The surge of 
internal wars after the Cold War was on top of an already high peak of conflicts erupting.55 
Besides the misconception that rise of intrastate violence is primarily due to a post-Cold 
War phenomenon, Feardon and Laitin also challenge the concept that the main reason intrastate 
conflicts are more common is because of a steady increase of conflicts breaking out.  In actuality, 
the numbers demonstrate that outbreak of civil war is actually not that statistically high or 
significant. In fact, since 1945, the rate of outbreak of civil wars within states has been just 2.3 
per year. While the outbreak percentage is relatively low, the conflicts only end at a rate of 1.7 
per year.56 With the wars out breaking at higher rates and not ending with the same momentum, it 
is apparent that internal conflicts are becoming a significant concern in the international 
community.  
On the contrary, interstate wars are not breaking out or enduring at the same rate as 
internal conflicts. For example, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) reported that the 
war between Djibouti vs. Eritrea in 2008 marked the first new interstate conflict erupting since 
2003.57 This accounts for the 36 conflicts present in the world at that time. While interstate 
conflicts have erupted, the only real prominent interstate conflicts erupting in the 2000s were 
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between Eritrea and Djibouti and India and Pakistan. The rest of the recent conflicts were 
internal in nature, scholars referring to them as enduring conflicts. 58 
In accordance with the rate between the outbreak and the end dates of civil war, scholars 
have acquired a general consensus that attributes that these conflicts are more predominant 
because as mentioned before, they are enduring situations. Peace becomes more of an 
unattainable goal, as the conflict does not end easily.59 Feardon and Laitin report that, “the 
average duration of the civil wars in progress have increased steadily from 2 years in 1947 to 
about 15 years in 1999.”60 Political Scientist analysts regard internal war of civil wars, 
insurgencies, and terrorism as durable due to the resilient nature of combatants involved in these 
situations.61 The particular case studies in this project particularly concern insurgencies that are 
of more durable nature. Thus, the resilience of the combatants involved will be later explored in 
detail later on in the chapter. However, not all internal conflicts last as long as the average rate of 
15 years.  
A possible way to understand the differing nature of long-term intrastate violence versus 
short-term violence is by comparing the intrinsic characteristics that differentiate between long 
term and short-term conflicts. John Feardon’s 2002 research, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So 
Much Longer Than Others?” goes into detail about specific factors contributing to civil wars 
becoming more of an enduring conflict over more of a short-term conflict. In his research, he 
distinguishes common themes present in short-term conflicts verse the common trends in long-
term conflicts. 
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Feardon distinguishes shorter civil wars in two ways, the first being that conflicts arise 
from coup attempts and overwhelmingly popular revolution movements. A coup inspired war is 
a “civil war between groups that aim to take control of a state, and that are led by individuals 
who were recently members of the state’s central government, including the armed forces.”62 
Short periods of violence from coup takeovers include coups in Latin America in the beginning 
of the Cold War such as Argentina in 1955, Paraguay in 1947, and the Dominican Republic in 
1965. Outside of Latin America, short violence periods came after coups in Iraq in 1959 and the 
Yemen Arab Republic in 1948. Overwhelmingly popular revolutions provoking eventual 
violence are civil wars “that, at its outset, involved mass demonstrations in the capitol city in 
favor of deposing the regime in power.”63 Examples include the Cuban revolution in 1958 and 
the Iranian Revolution. The Iranian Revolution, which only lasted from 1978-1979, resulted in 
the ousting of the king Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the implementation of the Iranian 
Republic. In coup and popular revolution wars, the median war duration is just at 2.1 years 
compared to the high median of non-coup and non-revolutionary wars, which on average last 
between 9.4 to 13.3 years.64 A potential explanation to why coup and popular revolutionary civil 
wars last significantly shorter is due to the fact that that these wars possess more of an “all or 
nothing” mentality.65 The coup leaders will either succeed with great results or fail and be 
crushed by the opposition, which pans out immediately.  
The second characterization of briefer civil wars is a civil war which if fought over a 
discontiguous territory.66 Wars that are fought over discontiguous territories refer to wars fought 
against colonial regimes. Such anticolonial civil wars were those seen in French Algeria in the 	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1950s and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya.67 Feardon’s research discovered in his empirical 
research that the average duration of decolonization wars were about 4.4 to 6.7 years.68 The short 
duration of these wars can be explained to both the cost of the war and international support. The 
colonial powers likely will not keep a war going for long due to the high nature of cost in 
conducting a war overseas and far from a home base. Furthermore, the colonial power would 
look unfavorable in the international community if they conducted such a war, and would likely 
not maintain domestic or international support.69 
In contrast from shorter civil wars, Feardon then differentiates circumstances of longer 
civil wars due to particular characteristics. He claims peripheral insurgencies are at the core of 
the explanation to why some internal wars last longer than others. Peripheral insurgencies, as 
defined by Feardon, are “civil wars involving rural guerilla bands operating typically near the 
state’s borders have, with a few interesting exceptions, been remarkably difficult to end.”70 
Peripheral insurgencies contain particular characteristics fueling the fire of the civil war, causing 
them to last far longer than other civil war situations. Feardon calls these insurgencies “sons of 
the soil.”71 These “sons of the soil” insurgencies lead civil wars to last far longer with an average 
duration of 27.2 to 39.1 years compared to 6 to 8.7 for the rest of the civil wars he examined.72 
 In contrast to the shorter civil wars, which arose from coups, popular revolutions, and 
anti-colonialism, these wars have a band of insurgent rebels who are willing to fight and stay at 
war. Rebels fighting for the cause, feel extremely strongly for the cause they fight for and will 
engage in more risks. The future case studies, which will be discussed later on, contain particular 
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attributes of peripheral insurgencies. These insurgencies were long lasting due to the resilient 
nature of these groups. The primary motivations for willingness to begin and stay at war will be 
examined below. 
 
Insurgencies 
 While wars between nations may not be as relevant in the years to come, insurgency 
warfare resulting in civil war in nations is likely to remain on the horizon. These civil wars stem 
from the enduring insurgencies of “sons of soil” which Feardon outlines above. Dr. Eliot A. 
Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State from 2007 to 2009, believes the global community 
has been generating a number of conditions allowing insurgencies to not only emerge, but also 
thrive. Cohen claims that while countries are less likely to engage in war against each other, 
“Insurgency, however, can and will flourish in the modern environment. The strains created by 
globalization, by the collapse of wear state structures, by demographic, environmental, and 
economic pressures… all augur in a period in which free and moderate governance is at risk.”73 
Instead of dismissing budding insurgencies, analysts should critically examine them carefully. 
Since insurgency warfare possesses the potential of erupting in varying states, the warfare poses 
the threat of seriously altering the makeup of the international political sphere.  
As established, the primary case studies examined in this thesis: Nepal, Sri Lanka, and 
Peru, concern violent intrastate conflicts fueled by initial insurgency movements. The particular 
insurgencies in examination are: Nepal with the People’s Liberation Army of the Communist 
Party of Nepal (PLA-CPN), the Partido Comunista de Peru-Sendero Luminoso or the 
Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (PCP-SL) for Peru, and finally Sri Lanka with the 	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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).74 Even though these insurgent groups possess 
particular characteristics unique to their situational circumstances, significant overlap does exist. 
Common intersections between the groups set up the potential for cross comparison. 
The United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative defines 
insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge 
political control of a region.”75 Most insurgencies aim for delegitimizing the government with the 
end goal of gaining control over the political sphere in the state. Other varying cases could be 
that the group desires secession from the state and form their own independent state, or they may 
request significant changes to the Constitution. The group uses violence as a political tool to 
acquire space where the group can exercise both their political and economic authority where 
before they may have been silenced.76 
As previously stated, individuals typically regard insurgencies as a movement with the 
goal of gaining territorial control of the state. Nonetheless, varying explanations for the 
incentives of insurgencies challenge this conception. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and 
John Tirman offer alternative explanations in their compilation of work: Terror, Insurgency, and 
the State. As a whole, their comparative project studies contemporary insurgencies, offering 
insight behind the organizations themselves. In the work, the authors lay out several types of 
insurgencies.  
The first type of insurgency they summarize is insurgencies that have the end goal of 
gaining either national liberation or national territory. These rebels can be secessionists such as 
the Tamils and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party who wished to secede and have their own 
independent state, separate from the government. Or, they can be both secessionists and 	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irredentists, advocating for the re-unification of their country such as the case with Hamas and 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA).77 Another potential explanation is that the groups are Marxist: 
driven by ideology. Such is the case for both the Maoists in Nepal and the Shining Path, as well 
as FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The Marxist rooted insurgencies 
commonly fuel on of the grievances of a collective group, often ethnically based. The leaders 
recognize grievances of a collective group of people, and mobilize support that way. Marxist 
insurgencies traditionally stress class struggles, inequalities between the elite and the common 
man, and socialism. Other insurgencies have more of a religious foundation. Hamas, Hezbollah, 
and the Jammu Kashmir Hizb-ul Mujahideen all are strictly Islamist. However, significant 
numbers of religious participants in insurgency movements are not limited to Islam. Both the 
Basque Country and Liberty (ETA) and the IRA insurgency movements had substantial numbers 
of practicing Catholics in their ranks, suggesting religion can act more as a recruitment method 
compared to having the foundation be on religion.78 
Relating back to the case studies, the PCP-SL, the PLA-CPN, and LTTE all possess some 
of the above characteristics for beginning an insurgency movement. These characteristics are 
also present in the way the groups recruited members. In regards to religion being an incentive, 
these case studies demonstrate slight indications that these insurgencies were overtly religious, 
but they do carry some attributes. Some scholars have theorized that the Maoists in Nepal could 
have mobilized supporters because of direct opposition with the Hindu caste system in Nepal.79 
The dissatisfaction with the caste system suggests underlying disagreements with the religious 
limitations in the state of Nepal. Secondly, while the LTTE was more ethnically based with the 
Tamils as an ethnic group, there were also religious components. In addition to being an ethnic 	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minority, the Tamils were typically Hindu, contrasting with the Singhalese who celebrate 
Buddhism.80   
Nevertheless, since these case studies are predominantly Marxist driven insurgencies, 
religion was not at the core. Both the foundation and the leaders were secular who just happened 
to be fighting regimes with an established religion, with the exception of Peru. All three of the 
cases have roots in Marxist ideologies. Marxist-Leninist thought commonly inspired recent 
insurgencies as “During the Twentieth Century, insurgents were often motivated by Marxism, 
religion or nationalism (or a combination of these).”81 While Marxist principles behind 
revolution influenced the Tamil Tigers, but the insurgency was not explicitly Marxist as an 
identity. The PCL-SL and PLA-CN were both more explicitly Marxist in all aspects of the 
movement. Specifically, both the Shining Path and the PLA-CN were both Maoist based.82  
Maoism refers to a branch of Marxism, which centers on the ideologies of Mao Zedong. 
Mao, once the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is “remembered as China’s 
paramount Marxist-Leninist leader and theorist.”83 Mao’s armed offense in the 1930s and 1940s 
defeated China, demonstrating that armed struggle can overtake a government.84 His success 
with leading a communist revolution outside of Russia paved the way for other communist 
revolutions to erupt after Mao especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Beforehand, these 
countries could not relate to Soviet communism, “It was really only after the emergence of the 
Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s – and especially after the onset of the Cultural Revolution (CR) in 
1966 – that Maoism was appreciated in the third world as a complete, military, political, cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 O’Leary and Tirmon, Introduction to Terror, Insurgency and the State, 3. 
81 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Counterinsurgency Guide, 6. 
82 O’Leary and Tirmon, Introduction to Terror, Insurgency and the State, 4.  
83 Timothy Cheek, A Critical Introduction to Mao, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4. 
84 Shaw, War and Genocide, 29. 	  
25	  	  
and economic ideology distinct from Soviet Communism.”85 Maoism offered a way for peasantry 
classes in these parts of the world to acquire national liberation. Appealing to marginalized 
peoples, Maoism “provided the ideological underpinnings and a practical blueprint for the 
struggle.”86  
Many of the insurgencies of the 20th century used Mao’s ‘Protracted Warfare’ model to 
achieve their motivations. The model “being monolithic organizations with a centralized, 
hierarchical command structure, clearly defined aims and a sequenced approach to achieve 
them.”87 Violence remains at the center of how these organizations achieve their goals. Insurgent 
groups utilize military tactics as a strategy to politically challenge an established state. 
However, these military tactics rarely compose of traditional warfare, making it 
significantly difficult to defeat. The groups practice unconventional warfare tactics such as 
guerilla warfare, terrorism, and coercion/intimidation with the goal of mobilizing a group to fight 
behind their common goal. In addition to militaristic tactics, insurgent activity also extends to 
political mobilization such as specific propaganda campaigns, party organization, and 
recruitment of combatants and supporters. 88 
 An insurgency movement goes through several phases before it reaches high levels of 
violence. All insurgencies begin from a revolutionary thought. Insurgency stems from 
revolutions that support them aim to destroy the power of established regimes.”89 It takes several 
steps before a revolution can turn into an insurgency, as actual fighting with combatants is the 
final step of a revolution. Essentially, “Insurgencies may evolve through some or all the stages of 
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subversion and radicalization, popular unrest, civil disobedience, localized guerilla activity, and 
widespread guerilla warfare to open, semi-conventional armed conflict.”90 First, pre-insurgency 
begins with the leadership’s conception. Second is organizational in which the group directly 
recruits guerillas and acquires supplies. The third phase is guerilla warfare where insurgents 
utilize unconventional war tactics against the government.  
 Guerilla warfare includes many avenues of violence. Insurgents do not have the same 
access to military materials as the government and utilize guerilla tactics such as “raids, 
ambushes, assassinations, sabotage, booby traps, and impoverished explosive devices take 
advantage of mobility, stealth, deception, and surprise to weaken, discredit or paralyze the less 
agile government security forces.”91 By nature, the guerilla practices are expected to last longer 
because they do not have conventional means of power. Feardon attests, “The strategy of 
violence in peripheral insurgencies is radically different. Rebel leaders rarely expect to win 
quickly by means of a tipping process that causes the government to collapse.”92 Insurgencies 
also utilize terrorism a tactic. All of these tactics aim to tire the governments by forcing them to 
exhaust their resources.93 Their strategies are able to flourish with set conditions that favor the 
peripheral insurgencies. Feardon and Laitin claim that insurgencies last so long and can be 
successful “by the presences of a rural base area, preferably with rough, inaccessible terrain; 
rebels with local knowledge of the population superior to the government’s, which aids rebels in 
hiding from superior government forces; and by foreign financial or logistic support and 
training.”94 
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 However with these practices, come unjustified killings of civilians. Insurgents will 
readily commit massive atrocities and appalling acts as they are “intended to prompt opponents 
to reach irrationally, in ways that harm their interests.”95 Insurgents will willingly murder 
civilians who work for the government in public, “thereby deterring others who might seek to 
work with the government.”96 Goldstein reports about an incident in Zimbabwe: “a peasant in 
Zimbabwe explained that guerrillas murdered someone who was helping the government in order 
to show that ‘they had the power to do anything and instill fear so that none would repeat the 
mistake.”97 During times of conflict, civilians will align with whomever to ensure their 
protection. Because of the instability of violence, “insurgents may be able to encourage people to 
turn to them in preference to the government to ‘restore’ to public order.” 98This phenomenon not 
just true for aligning with the insurgents, but with whoever controls the territory, be that either 
the insurgency or the government. The alignment may not necessarily resonant with the true 
sentiments of the individual.99 
Despite instances of violence against innocent civilians, insurgencies still manage to 
attract combatants willingly. Individuals justify acts of terror and violence. The 
Counterinsurgency Guide suggests that insurgencies promote their ideology but their 
methodology can “include the provision of money, basic social services, control of land, or 
positions of authority.”100 Additionally, the insurgency can recognize particular social ills and 
offer an alternative to alleviate grievances.  
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Partially the tactic works so well because of inequalities in both the economy and 
political access. Disparities within the economy can predispose presumed peaceful states to 
conflict.101 Situations of extreme poverty and economic inequalities amongst groups in states 
often leads towards extreme anger and hostility, encouraging individuals to find alternative 
methods to acquire their economic autonomy. Frances Stewart, director of Development Studies 
at Oxford, accounts that out of the ten poorest countries in the world, eight of them are currently 
experiencing violent conflict or have recently went through have recently witnessed or are 
currently experiencing violent conflict.102 This measure indicates a correlation between certain 
economic factors and the likelihood that an insurgency has the potential to gain momentum in 
areas that never seen violence beforehand. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom in 
“Post Conflict Risks,” stress the importance of examining economic conditions that ensure the 
feasibility of conflict rather than stressing on the motivation of the leaders of the insurgent 
groups themselves.103 As reiterated above, the charismatic leaders can thrive on the grievances of 
the population and use their situations to their advantage.  
In addition to the feasibility thesis, Political Scientists have put forth more hypotheses 
explaining this correlation between poor economic environments with high unemployment rates, 
periods of long economic stagnation with little or no economic growth, absent governmental 
services, and chronic poverty conditions.104 Stewart introduces some economic hypotheses: 
group motivation hypothesis, private motivation hypothesis, and the failure of the social contract. 
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These hypotheses attempt the task of explaining the apparent connection between rising 
insurgencies and inequality disparities.  
The group motivation hypothesis sheds light on how most conflicts concern fighting 
between differing groups. These groups may “be divided along cultural or religious lines, by 
geography, or by class.”105 However, simple differences in groups do not necessarily lead to 
fighting as Joshua A. Goldstein asserts, “High ethnic fractionalization in a society does not make 
war more likely.”106 Differences in groups must have another layer to make a group motivated to 
engage in conflict. Stewart affirms, “Group differences only become worth fighting for, 
however, if there are other important differences between groups, particularly in the distribution 
and exercise of political and economic power.”107 Such was the situation in Peru. Guzman 
mobilized Peruvian supporters “among his students and local peasants in the poor and 
mountainous South-Central Andes.”108 He appealed to the peasants by rallying on their group 
inequalities, gaining the name “Shampoo” for utilizing brainwashing tactics.109 Guzman 
mobilized the indigenous Inca behind his campaign by using the Andean metaphor of three 
mountains. The three mountains he defined as “the imperialism of the international superpowers, 
the semifeudalism of the Peruvian nation, and the bureaucratic capitalism of the regime in 
Lima.”110 The Counterinsurgency Guide attests that “The charisma of insurgent leaders can 
sometimes be more important than ideology in convincing others to join their movement.”111 
Guzman is just one example of a charismatic leader who was able to unite a group of alienated 
people, who might have never been inspired to act with violence beforehand. Essentially, a 	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charismatic leader can mobilize supporters easily if they belong to a specific group as Goldstein 
accounts “Ethnicity may make mobilization of people into a rebellion easier by increasing trust 
and cohesion within the group.”112 
 The private motivation hypothesis accounts for how insurgencies can motivate 
individuals to join their ranks based on compensatory reasons. It gives individuals a way to have 
employment with the army, which is especially appealing if there are high numbers of 
unemployment.113 The private motivation hypothesis can also be referred to as a “greed 
hypothesis.” Situations in Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia all specifically support the greed 
hypothesis. 114 War can create opportunities to make a profit in trading arms, producing illicit 
drugs, and trading in diamonds, timber, and other products.115  
 The third hypothesis, the failure of the social contract, is the conception that the 
government had failed the people and thus they responded with violence. Stewart states, “People 
accept state authority so long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic 
conditions (employment and incomes).”116 Without these services and resulting high levels of 
poverty, violence erupts. Some studies indicate that there is a correlation between low capita 
rates and poor economic growth with conflict erupting. For example, one study drew a 
correlation between GDP and likelihood for conflict. The study estimates that “the probability 
that a typical country would experience a new armed conflict within five years, based on its 
annual GDP per capita.”117 Additionally, James Feardon and David D. Laitin discovered in their 
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research that poverty is an important factor as it makes a state weak in itself.118 They claim, 
“Poverty should also directly favor insurgency by making the life of a guerrilla relatively more 
attractive and so aiding in recruitment.”119 Ultimately, when the government does not give the 
civilians any options, violence becomes a reasonable way to accomplish their desires.  
 All of these hypotheses offer some insight to not only why conflicts erupt but also how 
insurgent groups can use these grievances for their recruitment and mobilizing. Not all insurgents 
need to be fixated on the ideology behind the movement. “Insurgencies were often led by 
university educated ‘intellectual elites’ whose personal circumstances were sometimes far 
removed from those of the rank-and-file insurgents that they inspired.”120 Further, these 
hypotheses suggest that insurgencies motivations can overlap as there can be a combination of all 
these reasons contributing to motivation. 
 Because of a variety of potential motivations, insurgency groups rise. Chapter Two 
explicitly explores about how states consequently respond to these insurgent threats that directly 
endangers the state. 
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Chapter Two: State Response, Impunity, and Denial 
 
 
War can either be fought justly or unjustly… It is a crime to commit aggression, but aggressive 
war is a rule-governed activity. It is right to resist aggression, but the resistance is subject to 
moral (and legal) restraint.121 
-Michael Walzer 
 
As described in the previous chapter, peripheral insurgencies, or “sons of the soil” 
rebellions, pose a serious threat against the overall health of a state. Somehow, these non-state 
organizations acquire a means of violence with the direct intention of gaining political power 
against the state. Their motivations, deeply rooted in aggravated frustrations with the state, set up 
the conditions of an internal war when they challenge the state. When insurgent movements 
obtain a means of violence and mobilize civilians behind the cause, the movements directly 
challenge a state’s legitimacy for, “A legitimate government is one that can fight its own internal 
wars.”122 In order to regain legitimacy as a state against these threats, a state needs to formulate 
an appropriate response. States have a plethora of options they can use at their expense in 
responding to these threats. Above, Michael Walzer advises against a state choosing to respond 
by crossing moral and legal restraints. Rules of warfare and morality challenge a state’s choice 
when innocent lives are lost and human rights violations proliferate.  
 
Means of Violence: A State’s Right 
To reiterate, a state becomes illegitimate in the event it fails to fight internal challenges. 
Maintaining control within the borders of a state is critical to a state’s survival as an entity for a 
state’s validity resonates both in its ability to exercise control and protect its citizens. States 
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demonstrate control by employing its own means of violence against potential threats. Martin 
Shaw reiterates, “Authority was always intimately connected with the use of violence, since in 
order to become or remain legitimate, a state needed to be able to demonstrate its capacity to use 
force.”123 As the prior chapter suggests, controlling the monopoly of violence defines a state.  
 Though a means of violence connects directly to a state’s legitimacy, not all states will 
use their means of violence unless directly provoked. But when a tangible threat surfaces, states 
will engage in all necessary violence responses for states claim “rights to exercise particular 
kinds of violence and prevent others from doing so.”124 Peripheral insurgencies only become a 
tangible threat when an insurgency shifts from an ideological conception to an organization with 
actual weaponry. When the conception of an insurgency first develops, states hesitate to respond 
immediately due to lack of official threat, or the threat may be regarded as petty. Such was the 
case when the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) first emerged. Turkey hesitated to tangibly 
respond since it originally perceived the insurgency as a simple bandit organization targeting 
only wealthy Kurdish landlords.125 Peru’s response to the Shining Path took a slow trajectory as 
well. The government hesitated to respond until the PCP-SL transformed from enticing fear by 
hanging dogs from streetlights to actually acquiring arms, granting them full capability to launch 
serious attacks against the Peruvian police and unarmed civilians. Once the threat escalated, the 
Peruvian state needed to tactfully respond to the threat.126   
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Counterinsurgency Initiatives 
States engage in counterinsurgency policies and practices in order to respond to insurgent 
threats. All counterinsurgency movements stem from situations as the one described in Turkey 
and Peru, wherein a state faces a direct attack to their control of the monopoly of violence.  The 
Counterinsurgency Guide defines counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military 
efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”127 The 
state employs its military and other coercive agents to either eliminate the threat in entirety, or 
constrain the threat. Direct counterinsurgency initiatives depend largely on the situational factors 
within the country itself as well as the nature of the insurgency itself. The nature of 
counterinsurgencies depends on three factors: “the characteristics of the environment (physical, 
economic, political and human) in which it takes place; the nature of the insurgent group (or 
groups); and the nature of the counterinsurgent government and its security forces.”128  
According to the Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, a government waits to begin a 
counterinsurgency initiative until a defined perceived threat exists as explored earlier with both 
the PKK and the PCP-SL. Governmental response to pre-insurgency is minimal as it just 
involves a leadership emerging. When an insurgency movement shifts towards a more 
organizational stage when it recruits guerilla combatants, obtains supplies, and gains support 
from other nations, governments will develop a counterinsurgency organization. Usually, the 
government will not respond with militia warfare until the insurgency begins using actual 
guerilla warfare tactics. While not all insurgencies reach this point, in the instance that 
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insurgencies reach the point of conventional warfare, the government utilizes its own 
conventional warfare tactics and engages in a civil war against the opposition. 
Once a state commences a counterinsurgency initiative, it quickly proves to be an 
arduous undertaking. Committing to a counterinsurgency movement means that it will cost the 
government both an extreme amount of money and time.129 This can be seen in the conflict 
between FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the Colombian 
government. The enduring conflict begun in 1964 and is showing little signs from ending any 
time soon.130 The Colombian state and its coercive agents were incapable of putting an easy end 
to the influence of FARC, draining resources as well as costing thousands of lives in the process. 
A state’s main priority behind counterinsurgency movements is to “build popular support for a 
government while marginalizing the insurgents: it’s therefore fundamentally an armed political 
competition with the insurgents.”131 Since counterinsurgencies can progress into armed 
competition, besides money and time, countless combatants and noncombatants lives are lost in 
the process.   
Idealistically, governments launch counterinsurgency movements with the intention of 
protecting the population from groups using violence against them. Unfortunately, 
counterinsurgency efforts often escalate into situations where states engage in criminal violations 
against unarmed civilians, contributing towards state mistrust. Oftentimes during 
counterinsurgency initiatives, lines blur and civilians are caught in the crossfires. Shaw confirms, 
“Because guerilla war is irregular and often seeks to overcome the power advantages of orthodox 
states, its practice has long been accompanied by violence against (actual or putative) civilian 
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supporters of the state.”132 A primary reason why criminal violations against unarmed civilians 
occur is because counterinsurgency movements are more population-centric over enemy-
centric.133 Counterinsurgency efforts cannot be specifically enemy-centric because of the nature 
of the insurgencies they resist. Since these intrastate conflicts are “Peoples Wars,” civilians 
experience significant violence. 
As explored in Chapter One, “People’s Wars” or Maoist theories on guerilla warfare, 
have dominated most of the revolutions in the last half-century. At the core of Maoist principle is 
“the total mobilization and involvement of ‘the people’—ordinary nonmilitary citizens who 
could otherwise be thought of as civilians.”134 Mao illustrates the total involvement of the people 
by referring to the troops as the “fish” and civilians as the “water.” The “water” determines the 
“fish’s” survival. In essence, without the “water”, the civilians, the troops perish. Civilians 
provide insurgencies with housing, food, and other necessary materials for survival. Due to the 
ingrained nature of this relationship between combatants and civilians in insurgent warfare, an 
appropriate counterinsurgency movement needs to come up with a solution that effectively ends 
the supply of the “water.” 
The fact that the government cannot easily distinguish insurgents apart from the general 
population, gives tremendous advantages for insurgent movements. Feardon and Laitin assert, “If 
government forces knew who the rebels were and how to find them, they would be fairly easily 
destroyed or captured.”135 Considering that insurgencies lack the same wealth of resources 
compared to states such as advanced weaponry, governmental security forces could easily defeat 
the insurgent movement. Subsequently, insurgents employ alternative methodology to make the 	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counterinsurgency initiative that much more complicated by integrating combatants among 
civilian. A successful counterinsurgency initiative is one that effectively separates 
noncombatants and rebels without limiting the life experience of noncombatants.136 Achieving 
this, however, proves exceedingly difficult. 
When removed from conflict situations, one can claim that it is easy to discern who is a 
civilian verses who is a combatant. Civilians are clearly unarmed men, women, and children. In 
contrast, in the midst of internal conflict, it has become increasingly difficult discerning who 
supports the insurgency verses those who support the state. Therefore, “Cruel tyrants may not 
care whether or not the people are in support of what they do and end up killing many of their 
people in the process.”137 For instance, this occurred in Nepal when Nepalese security forces 
infiltrated countryside villages. Security forces were unable to easily differentiate the rebels from 
the rest of the population and resultantly inflicted harm on innocent Nepalese in their efforts to 
end the Maoist threat.  
Stopping insurgencies is challenging for these typical assumptions we make about 
innocent civilians needing protection are often blurred for the civilians are the “water” in the 
insurgency. In the midst of war, especially intrastate wars, “The great majority of people who 
decide to kill civilians do so because they cannot truly accept that most people who are not 
armed really do exist “outside” the war somehow and should be protected from its suffering.”138 
To an extent, this perception is sometimes accurate: not all civilians are blameless.139 The 
generalization that all civilians are innocent proves to be a dangerous assumption as scattered 
throughout the population are people that possess a “wide spectrum of different interests, roles, 
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and views in the war.”140 Some innocent appearing civilians could actually have an intrinsic role 
in the conflict. 
Regardless of the possibility that civilians are supporters of the insurgency, when state 
actors eliminate the “water,” they directly violate international law by engaging in unjust 
behaviors. The Geneva Convention in 1949 established specific treaties in international 
humanitarian law. The international community adopted two other Protocols in 1977 and 2005 to 
address more specifically how combatants should behave during conflict, particularly in regards 
of how they should protect civilians.141 When violence extends beyond justified behaviors and 
becomes unnecessary or cruel, it becomes criminal according to international law, especially 
when violence involves non-combatants. While violence and cruelty certainly overlap, “Cruelty, 
on the other hand, can never be justified because it is the intentional infliction of physical pain on 
individuals who are in a position of weakness.”142 By definition, civilians are in a position of 
weakness as they lack necessary means to defend themselves. The Sri Lankan government’s 
decision to attack the “No Fire Zone,” fully aware of the innocent civilians trapped there, 
represents a concrete example of such cruelty. While these humanitarian laws are in place, they 
cannot explicitly undermine the means of violence each state has for its sovereignty. 
During combat, violence is justified when violence becomes necessary for the purpose of 
achieving goals and for resisting aggression. By definition, soldiers are liable to be killed 
because “soldiers as a class are set apart from the world of peaceful activity; they are trained to 
fight, provided with weapons, required to fight on demand.”143 Fair aggression against soldiers is 
a completely justified process in warfare. Insurgents directly surrender their noncombatant status 	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and are liable to be killed as they engage in war tactics. On the other hand, this blatantly 
disregards the common occurrence of insurgent groups forcibly recruiting rebels, including the 
practice of child soldiers.  
 The rebel organization’s usage of terrorist tactics directly blurs the line between unjust 
and just behavior for state actors’ aggression in responding to these threats. In essence, terrorist 
warfare deliberately violates all conventional rules of war by intentionally targeting 
noncombatants. This is demonstrated with suicide bombing tactics used by both Hamas and the 
Tamil Tigers. Nevertheless, in responding to these threats, state actors should avoid violating the 
rights of civilians and breaching beyond the brutality of the opposition. In spite of this delicate 
balance, states engage in behaviors that undeniably infringe on international law such as 
detention without trial, kidnapping, prisoner abuse, and torture.144 These crimes are similar to the 
non-state actor’s actions but “because the government’s actions are defined as legitimate and 
necessary to ensure national security, the public usually accepts the alibi, making it complicit in 
crimes of power.”145 In essence, state actors justify these severe measures by claiming their 
reaction necessary against the terrorist threat. 
 
 
A Culture of Impunity Permits Violations  
 A culture of impunity encourages these severe measures. Impunity is when perpetrators 
fear no consequences for inflicting mass atrocities and human rights violations, allowing any 
behaviors for successful outcomes. Alex J. Bellamy for the Stanley Foundation suggests that if 
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three factors are present in early level violence, it provides the conditions for government actions 
to easily escalate to mass atrocities. The three factors are: 
1. Violence intentionally targeted against civilians 
2. Impunity for the perpetrators of these early crimes. 
3. The existence of a significant threat to the survival of the governing 
regime and failure of initial attempts to counter that threat.146 
 
These factors certainly do not guarantee that mass atrocities will occur on a reoccurring basis, 
but they do offer a prediction. The likelihood that mass atrocities will occur is significantly 
higher. The first instance, violence against civilians, works as a form of a “trial massacre.” Once 
perpetrators realize they can get away without repercussions for no one was arrested nor did any 
explicit international pressure transpire, the necessary components of a cycle of impunity are 
solidified.147 Once the perpetrators enjoy no ramifications, they know that future instances of 
violence against civilians could similarly go unpunished. Therefore, it becomes more feasible 
that future atrocities on a larger scale could be employed without hesitation.148  
 Once a culture of impunity is established during intrastate conflict, violence escalates 
significantly. This is evident in the case studies of Nepal, Peru, and Sri Lanka. In fighting the 
PCP-M, Nepali security forces dramatically escalated repression after King Gyanendra staged a 
coup against the civilian government. Under the coup, Nepal soon became a worldwide leader in 
enforced disappearances in the early 2000s. With the emergence of the Shining Path, the 
Peruvian government decided to respond with violence. Fighting the Shining Path, the Peruvian 
military “enjoyed a vast new sphere of power over the Peruvian countryside, generous arms 
expenditures, virtual legal immunity and autonomy in the conduct of its counterinsurgency 	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campaign.”149 Effectively, the military had complete impunity as they also controlled the judicial 
system, allowing all violations to go unpunished.  
 
Challenging the Practice of Denial  
In order to cover up atrocities from armed conflict and avoid responsibility for these 
violations, states potentially engaged in denial practices post-conflict. The practice of denial 
directly interferes with accountability and disrupts sustainable peace prospects. Stanley Cohen in 
States of Denial suggests that some states try to use psychological concepts such as cultural 
repression, shared amnesia and forgetting, and collective denial assuming “that an entire society 
can forget, repress, or dissociate itself from its discreditable past record.”150 States engage in 
collective denial and forgetting through “official state policy—the deliberate cover-up, the 
rewriting of history—or through cultural slippage in which information just disappears.”151 This 
type of denial occurred when the Sudanese government engaged with a policy of denial, 
claiming that no attacks occurred on civilians at all, despite concrete evidence. Furthermore, El 
Salvador engaged in similar behavior when it claimed that a massacre of 794 people did not 
transpire despite The New York Times publishing a detailed account of the massacre.152  The 
instances of denial by El Salvador and Sudan represent outright denial, which is rare. Statements 
of denial manifest into several forms such as disputing accusations that are unreliable, claiming 
the violation was something else entirely, or by justifying their actions by defending their actions 
were an appropriate moral response.153  
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Collective denial by states directly hinders any possibility of post-conflict healing as 
states used their coercive power to prevent accountability for human rights violations. The only 
accountability for war crimes resides with the “loser” of the war as the “winner” enjoys eminent 
impunity for their actions. However, blocking full accountability and avoiding ways of healing 
might be dangerous. Failure to prosecute human rights violations potentially molds a country to 
foster a culture of impunity throughout the future of the state, resulting in grave consequences. 
Kathryn Sikkink suggests that if no one prosecutes individuals for human rights violations, it 
“leads to a particular set of expectations—a culture of impunity that in turn can rebound back 
into more violations.”154 As we will see in Peru’s case study, Fujimori ran the state rooted in 
corruption practices. With a culture of impunity in place, it fosters negative attitudes that 
permeate into the future of the state since governmental authorities and other perpetrators who 
committed atrocities will still likely possess positions of political power.   
With these leaders maintaining coercive power, impunity flourishes in the transitional 
government creating extreme tensions as victims struggle to heal from the conflict. Disallowing 
victims to heal by seeking justice and receiving appropriate reparations creates problems as these 
conflicts leave victims with deeply rooted feelings of embitterment for both the non-state actors 
and state agents. Addressing issues of accountability, justice, the truth, are all critical 
considerations. However, the potential to challenge these situations are dependent based on the 
willingness of the state to engage in these practices. The next chapter explores the limitations 
states face post-conflict to combat both impunity and address the painful memories from conflict.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World 
 Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2011), 158.  
43	  	  
Chapter Three: Transitional Justice  
 
People always ask, ‘Why reopen wounds that have been closed?’... “Because they were badly 
closed. First you have to cure the infection, or they will reopen themselves.155 
             -Horacio Verbitsky  
       Argentine Journalist 
 
Once internal conflict ends, states are placed in a transitional period, left with unresolved 
questions from the past. Horacio Verbitsky stresses that it is critical for states to “cure the 
infection” by critically addressing the “wounds” from the conflict. Providing answers for 
survivors who experienced grave human rights violations and trauma directly works to heal these 
wounds. States have a variety of options of addressing these answers: by ignoring them, giving 
amnesty to the perpetrators as part of a political deal, creating fact-finding commissions, or 
bringing perpetrators to trial.”156 Actively being able to engage in methods to address 
accountability for violations depends largely on the political context of the respective state. As 
Chapter Two stresses, states that transfer impunity practices from the conflict will unlikely 
explore measures that threaten their legitimacy and hold them accountable for violations. 
However, these measures may offer critical solutions to the healing of the embittered wounds 
post-conflict which threaten to resurface.  
 
Transitional Justice as an Alternative Method 
Methods of transitional justice efforts propose potential techniques for “curing the 
infection” that Verbitsky urges needs healing by directly working with civilian demands and 
concerns. Before a state can establish a pathway towards sustainable peace, some form of healing 
and addressing of the past needs to occur. Because state and non-state actors have relationships 	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based on intense feelings of hatred, a negotiation does not necessarily solidify peace. While 
compromises between forces resolve the end of fighting and can establish a new political system, 
the fact remains that, “The very best democratic system in the world produced by the most able 
democrats will not survive if the general population to which it applies are not minimally 
prepared to trust the system and each other.”157 There needs to be an additional forum to discuss 
these sentiments and address hostile relationships for the whole population. Addressing these 
sentiments allows a “minimum basis of trust so that there can be a degree of cooperation and 
mutual reliance between them.”158Transitional justice can work as that forum.  
Transitional justice offers several avenues for states transitioning from periods of state 
and insurgent violence. The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines 
transitional justice as “a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights. It 
seeks recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and 
democracy.”159 The premise behind transitional justice is to give victims of human rights 
violations the right to the truth, receive reparations, and ensure the perpetrators are punished 
appropriately.160 Various methods in transitional justice can be utilized to accomplish these goals 
for victims after periods of insurgent violence. These basic approaches include: criminal 
prosecutions, reparation programs, truth commissions, gender justice, security system reform, 
and memorialization efforts.161 With all of these options come significant benefits as well as 
potentially hazardous risks. Both the risks and benefits will be explored below, taking examples 
from societies who engaged in transitional justice. 
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Many Faces of Justice: Exploring Retributive Justice and Restorative Justice Options 
 Individuals define “justice” in their own particular way. Not one conventional all-
encompassing definition for the term exists as, “It can mean fairness, political and economic 
equality of both opportunity and outcome, and accountability.”162 This is especially evident in 
post-conflict circumstances. Before engaging in justice practices, states must determine how 
deeply they want to engage in justice, distinguishing where the line ends before justice turns 
more into a method of revenge. Kathryn Sikkink determines that there are three possible models 
for addressing accountability and justice: 1) the impunity model, 2) the state accountability 
model, and 3) the individual criminal accountability model.163 Post-conflict societies can directly 
apply these models to their circumstantial situations by engaging in either impunity or the 
transitional justice methods of retributive or restorative justice.  
The impunity model, or excuse from justice, in post-conflict situations only applies to the 
“winners” of the conflict as the victors often prosecute the “losers.” Despite the fact that the 
victors committed similar crimes, they are virtually excused from all accountability. Historically 
speaking, states have only taken the easier, first model of impunity for decades. Up until the late 
1980s and early 1990s, almost universally, states shielded human rights abusers from punishment 
by avoiding perusing accountability for human rights abuses completely.164 Instead of indicting 
either leaders of rebel groups or leaders of states for crimes against humanity, these individuals 
could leave the country, escaping responsibility for their actions. Such was the case with the 
dictators Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier in Haiti and Idi Amin in Uganda who found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 12.	  	  
163 Ibid., 13-14. 
164 Rebecca K. Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 1.   
46	  	  
sanctuary elsewhere without facing prosecution.165 While impunity remains prevalent throughout 
the world as leaders of states remain in power despite engaging in serious human rights 
violations such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the world is now witnessing a dramatic shift as 
regimes fall and change. The fall of political regimes opens up the possibility of exploring 
accountability holistically and engaging in more options. 
 One justice option post-conflict societies can choose is retributive justice. Retributive 
justice measures depend on achieving justice by concrete criminal prosecutions, a largely 
western concept. Supporters of retributive justice believe in it because it stresses that perpetrators 
need a definitive form of punishment. They argue that an official prosecution leads towards “the 
gradual building of self-confidence and mutual trust, and implanting a culture of human rights 
and democracy.”166 Without prosecution, complete trust in the state is unattainable. However, 
“Prosecutions of human rights violators remain the rarest, most controversial, and most difficult 
to implement of the options available to a transitioning state.”167 One of the primary reasons why 
prosecutions are so controversial is because the trials may not be completely fair, resulting in the 
enragement of the allies of those prosecuted. If the trials are completed in an “unjust” way, it 
directly impedes a completely just process of ensuring accountability. Also, prosecutions may 
not resonate with the sentiments of the population based on cultural circumstances or religious 
beliefs. 
Criminal prosecutions ultimately result in the investigation and indictment of the major 
generals or perpetrators either during the conflict or previous administration.168 A fair 
prosecution can be held in either national tribunals within states as seen in Ethiopia or in 	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international tribunals. International tribunals such as the International Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Court of Justice, or the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
can substitute national tribunals in instances where the state does not have the capacity to carry 
out a fair trial.169  
Retributive justice provides several benefits: it prevents private revenge, it ensures 
perpetrators will not return to leadership positions, it gives victims concrete closure with a guilty 
verdict, it individualizes guilt, strengthens the value of democracy in the state post conflict, and 
directly ends the cycle of impunity.170 These advantages are undeniably beneficial. Prosecutions 
guarantee that former leaders responsible for the most severe violations of human rights will not 
return to power and be able to inflict these types of violations again. We live in a society where 
former leaders can be jailed for their decisions and actions during their administration, something 
inconceivable beforehand. The arrest of Augusto Pinochet in 1998 by the United Kingdom 
“shattered the image of heads of state as beyond the reach of law.”171 Pinochet’s arrest 
demonstrated that no one is necessarily immune from justice. Individualizing guilt is critical in 
situations like Rwanda, where a significant amount of the community likely engaged in criminal 
behaviors. Instead of blaming the Hutu community with collective guilt, retributive justice 
results in individual accountability that prevents negative stereotypes against an entire group 
“which may provoke more violence in turn.”172 If states can surpass the difficulties that come 
with implementing an effective trial, retributive justice is certainly a worthwhile consideration 
for the transitional justice process.  
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 While criminal prosecution offers many benefits, retributive justice measures often come 
with significant shortcomings and limitations. States may need to stop their retributive justice 
process midway before completion due to a variety of factors. For instance, Argentina began its 
justice process with the Trials of the Juntas in 1985 but was forced to stop the process just two 
years into the process.173 Another shortcoming is that the process in itself may disrupt the peace 
process as more focus may be placed on prosecuting criminals over concentrating on the 
transition to a new government and formulating a return to normalcy. Further concerns include: 
that the fast nature of the trial may result in trials being unequal or ineffective due to urgency, 
that the trials may violate traditional rule-of-law, that courts cannot accommodate situations 
when both sides have inflicted crimes, that there is too much focus on individual guilt over 
patterns in atrocities, and that trials may directly interfere with the culture of a particular 
society.174 Before communities engage in a system of justice, post-conflict policymakers need to 
address crucial questions including whether they should bring to trial both anti-state actors and 
state actors and whether they should only investigate leaders or other actors as well like torturers. 
In order to best achieve justice goals, transitioning governments must “strike a balance between 
the demands of retributive justice and political prudence or, in other words, to reconcile moral 
imperatives and political constraints.”175 The balance can occur only if both the risks and 
advantages are carefully weighed beforehand.  
 Not all transitioning governments conclude that retributive justice is the most viable 
answer for their circumstances. Instead, they decide to focus more on restorative justice 
measures. The most prominent example is in the way South Africa handled the transition from 
apartheid. Desmond Tutu claims that for South Africa justice is different, as South Africa needs 	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justice that rehabilitates “both the victims and the perpetrator, who should be given the 
opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence.”176 
Hesitations such as those in South Africa have led some post-conflict communities to apply 
restorative justice over retributive justice. Instead of being perpetrator-oriented, restorative 
justice “works with the full participation of the victim and of the relevant communities in 
discussing facts, identifying the causes of misconduct and the defining sanctions. The ultimate 
aim is to restore relations as far as possible, both between victim and offender and within the 
broader community to which they belong.”177 Restorative justice often employs a combination of 
other transitional justice measures, which will be explored below.  
 
Reparations for the Victims 
 Reparations pursue mediating some of the wounds victims from conflict acquired. ICTJ 
defines reparations as “state-sponsored initiatives that help repair the material and moral 
damages of past abuse.”178 These measures can be either material or financial, or in the form of 
apologies. Past examples of reparations include Germany compensating Israel for Holocaust 
crimes or when the United States government gave financial reparation to Japanese-American 
internment camp descendants.179 As seen with the examples of both Israelis and Japanese-
American internment victims, reparations have traditionally been only associated with 
addressing abuses further in the past than more recent situations.  
As transitional justice expands as a field and becomes more prevalent in the international 
community, reparations are becoming more common in the transition practices from post-
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conflict and post-authoritarian rule and working towards healing for the future.180 While there has 
been considerable progression, reparations are far from being a perfect system. Resultantly, they 
need to be considered more of a partial gesture as victims “may be repelled by the idea that their 
suffering can be ‘compensated,’ and may see this as paying people off to keep quiet.”181 Further, 
reparations pose dangers when reparation programs do not fulfill all the promises that the 
programs proposed due to financial or other constraints.   
 The Handbook to Reconciliation claims that while reparation efforts have appeared under 
various terms, they all embody efforts to repair past abuses. These terms include: restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and redress.182 “Restitution” can be defined as the “re-
establishment of the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed.”183 This 
practice determines that if possible, victims will receive stolen property back and or freedoms 
and legal rights which might have been taken during conflict. While the premise of restoring a 
community back to its previous condition pre-conflict appears favorable, it also brews numerous 
complaints. For example, in the event that communities were in dire poverty pre-conflict, it is 
offensive for reparation programs to suggest that they restore these communities back to their 
previous condition, instead of advocating for improving the condition itself. Particular attention 
should focus on improving conditions in instances of post-conflict societies where insurgencies 
mobilized support behind inequality grievances. 
The second term, “compensation,” refers to states paying victims money acknowledging 
their mistakes and attempting to mediate for what the victims lost.184 Compensation efforts can 
account for nominal damages, pecuniary damages, moral damages, and punitive damages. 	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Nominal damages offer victims a small portion of money to represent the return of rights, 
pecuniary damages aim to give a financial equivalent to the harm a victim experienced, moral 
damages relate to “immaterial harm, such as fear, humiliation, mental distress or harm to a 
person’s reputation or dignity,” and punitive damages are “intended rather to punish or deter than 
to make up for the loss suffered.”185 Compensation can become controversial as in Argentina, a 
family member of a disappeared laments, “Life doesn’t have a price. The reparation only buys 
your conscience and sells your blood. The president is likely to say to us, ‘You can’t talk, we 
paid you.”186 Compensation efforts should explicitly reiterate from the beginning that the 
reparation is not meant to put a price on the suffering. 
“Rehabilitation” aims to mediate any health complications from the conflict as internal 
conflict often results in victims suffering both extreme physical and psychological problems. In 
terms of physical problems, victims could have been maimed during crossfire between the anti-
state actors and the state actors, or even could be injured post-conflict with landmines in 
countries such as in Afghanistan or Cambodia. Or survivors of conflict may experience 
psychological problems such as refugees from the Bosnian Genocide suffering with Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Rehabilitation efforts directly tackle these ailments.   
Finally, “satisfaction,” encompasses a more controversial form of reparation. Under the 
umbrella of satisfaction, is the gesture of a formal apology by perpetrators accompanied with 
acknowledgement of the past atrocities.187Apologies sometimes come immediately, but as seen in 
El Salvador, official apologies can come years later.188 Apologies by nature can be empty and 
ultimately “unsatisfying” for survivors, as they may appear half-hearted and forced. The 
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Japanese lack of apology and remorse for South Korean comfort women during World War II 
particularly has been controversial. Oftentimes, state leaders avoid apologizing altogether such 
as the President of Sierra Leone in 2004.189 Yet, apologies are necessary acknowledgements of 
wrongdoing if done in the right way.  
 Reparations are by no means perfect. They can fall short to their proposed goals because 
of a lack of funding and may take too long to formulate and make decisions such as discerning 
who should receive reparations verse those who should not have priority. Despite imperfection, 
reparations potentially offer critical services to states in post-conflict situations. Even though 
many can be left dissatisfied by the efforts of reparations, “they may do far more to improve the 
lives of survivors than granting them to put their enemies in the docket ever could.”190 The 
international community increasingly stresses the need for reparation programs. Specifically, UN 
has discerned the importance with its 2005 document: The Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.191 One of the greatest 
problems exists in regards to reparation programs is discerning who qualifies as a victim 
deserving reparation. These judgments are especially problematic when a majority of the 
population was victimized and affected by the war, like in Sierra Leone.192 Adding to the issue 
with implementing reparation programs are monetary and time constraints, as these programs 
cannot materialize automatically. Money for reparations causes controversy in that taxpayers 
may end up paying for programs or victims may regard reparations as “blood money” when the 
guilty pay for their misconduct. Nevertheless, reparations deserve critical consideration, as 
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transitional justice measures need to address situations “where gross inequalities are a product of 
past oppression.”193 Such was the case especially for the conflicts in Peru, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.  
 
The Right to Know the Truth: Truth Commissions 
Truth in general is subjective, and it is even more subjective in post-conflict societies. 
Perceptions of the truth are subject to change as Priscilla B. Hayner asserts, “The search for truth 
does seem a simple idea. It is, instead, usually very difficult and contentious, but worth the many 
efforts to try to get it right.”194 While the process of creating a high functioning truth commission 
will be an arduous journey, for nation-states post intrastate violence, the process itself is 
necessary to explore as a potential option. Uncovering the history of the past through truth telling 
and fact-finding ideally sets up appropriate conditions for mediating formerly divided nation-
states as it provides for the transition of a nation-state founded on mutual trust and 
understanding.195 Truth commissions serve as both investigation processes and reporting on 
periods of abuse.196 Full acknowledgement of the truth asserts governments no longer can hide 
behind their denials.  
 Stanley Cohen suggests that engaging in truth-seeking practices is critical for three 
distinct reasons. The first is that it is important for states to acknowledge abuses that they may 
have denied. Though individuals remember the past and what occurred, an official assertion that 
events happened is critical. The second reason is “the special sensitivity of the victims.”197 
Exposing the truth offers potential closure for victims by offering unresolved answers for 
“disappeared” family members and asserting that the use of torture was unjustified. Finally, 	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Cohen’s third reason is that truth commissions aim for ensuring that these abuses will “never 
again” happen. When states expose the past, it is hoped that the horror of the past itself will be 
enough to warn future generations from letting it happen again.198   
 Truth commissions are one of the more popular methods for transitioning societies from 
internal conflict. Since 1974, there have been roughly 40 cases alone. While not all truth 
commissions were the most effective and may have needed to end early, with all the failures 
come noteworthy success stories. For instance, the truth commission in Guatemala after its civil 
war: the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have 
Caused the Guatemalan People to Suffer.199 After going through great lengths to find people to 
give testimony, trekking through mountains to interview survivors, Guatemala’s commission 
produced monumental findings, asserting that under counterinsurgency operations, higher 
authorities of the state committed acts of genocide against the Mayans.200 Such assertions against 
state authorities would have been virtually impossible beforehand without the truth commission. 
Morocco represents another success, as its 2004 commission, “stands apart in the speed and 
efficient with which the state has implemented the commission’s recommendations for 
reparations.”201 Some 9,000 victims have benefited so far from financial reparations from the 
commission.  
While there have been roughly 40 instances of truth commissions thus far, not all are 
referred to as truth commissions as “some of them did not at the time of their operation consider 
themselves to be truth commissions, nor were they understood to be such by the wider public.”202 
In fact, the first well-known commission in Argentina in 1983 is still called the CONADEP, or 	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the National Commission on the Disappeared.203 As the Argentine commission’s name suggests, 
commissions can be highly specific for the truth it sets to find. Due to the varying nature, truth 
commissions can easily get convoluted for what they aim to resolve and what they do not. 
Hayner’s definition of truth commissions provides some clarity for what truth commissions do or 
do not aim to accomplish: 
A truth commission (1) is focused on the past, rather than on going, events;  (2) 
investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages 
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their 
experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final report; 
and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review.204 
 
 
Her definition clearly outlines both the capabilities and necessary circumstances of truth 
commissions. As previously discussed, additional transitional justice measures such as 
reparations and criminal prosecutions in some countries would have been virtually impossible 
without the work of truth commissions. By using testimonies from victims, truth commissions 
discern specific needs of survivors and recommend essential reparations to accommodate these 
needs.  
Overwhelmingly, commissions can potentially provide necessary information that aids 
domestic or international tribunals. Some mandates include the need to end impunity, and urge 
directly for criminal justice. Hayner suggests that the information truth commissions creates is 
critical for prosecutions claiming that in the past they have “contributed directly and successfully 
to prosecutions, even resulting, in rare cases, in the conviction and jailing of top commanders or 
political leaders.”205 While truth commissions by nature cannot explicitly prosecute perpetrators, 
the wealth of information they produce is monumental, by gathering victim’s accounts and 	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specific instances during the conflict. The fact that truth commissions merely provide 
information, but do not prosecute is critical. Criticizers of truth commissions often become 
disgruntled with the limits of truth commissions when criminal prosecutions do not follow after 
because they assumed that prosecutions were guaranteed. Despite these limitations, commissions 
can “build a case for and recommend forms of accountability short of criminal sanction, such as 
civil liability, removal from office, restitution or community service schemes.”206 The wealth of 
information for these cases would be impossible without the critical recommendations from 
commissions.  
Critics of truth commissions claim that they foster too many unrealistic expectations for 
victims. A truth commission does not have the capacity, nor is it the goal, to solve all of a 
country’s problems. Ultimately, truth commissions have the potential to offer critical services for 
nation-states in transitions from internal conflict. They must work in accordance with other 
transitional justice measures to expand beyond just asserting the truth. Working with other 
methods can bring either justice or reparations for victims. However, these benefits will likely 
take a considerable amount of time. Truth commissions need to be an all-encompassing effort, 
engaging with a variety of individuals who had different roles in the conflict from both non-state 
and state actors and victims. South Africa’s Truth Commission offers a concrete example as it 
got all actors to testify, including members of the armed wing of the African National Congress 
(ANC). However, with South Africa’s quest for a “full truth,” comes controversy as it granted 
ANC perpetrators amnesty for fully disclosing their involvement in crimes during the apartheid 
era. All that was required for amnesty was for perpetrators to demonstrate that their crimes were 
politically motivated and they did not have to give “an apology nor any sign of remorse.”207 	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Because of South Africa’s practice of amnesty, it remains unlikely that future truth commissions 
will be willing to engage in efforts to find the “full truth.” 
Truth commissions certainly spur a variety of complaints in post-conflict communities, 
particularly among perpetrators who do not want to be exposed and in hesitant victims who do 
not want to relieve their pain. Engaging in these efforts is critical though, because “At the very 
least, a nation unable to acknowledge its past publically is less likely to be able to prevent new 
human rights violations.”208 
 
Keeping the Memory Alive: Memorialization 
 Along with truth being extremely disputed, perceptions of “accurate” memory are also 
extremely contentious. Therefore, efforts to memorialize from post-conflict periods bring intense 
debates. Memorialization efforts according to the ICTJ can include “museums and memorials 
that preserve public memory of victims and raise moral consciousness about past abuse, in order 
to bulwark against its recurrence.”209 The feeling of needing to commemorate victims has deep 
roots as societies have been “building statues, naming streets and city squares after them, poetry 
and prayer, vigils and marches” for hundreds of years.210 Memorialization efforts works toward 
both remembering and honoring victims of suffering, especially when they take the shape of 
memorials that can offer as concrete places that serve as places to honor the past and potentially 
bring some closure to victims.211 Museums also seek to educate the younger generations about 
the past, fostering commitments to avoid repeating the past. Memorialization efforts cultivate 
states of collective memory, ending a state’s insistence on denying and forgetting the past.  
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Some memorialization efforts can be more informative than others. One example is how 
the Museum of the Potential Holocaust in Jerusalem incorporates a historical narration of the 
Holocaust as well as warning against repeating the Holocaust by showing modern day examples 
of anti-Semitic photos.212 Other memorialization efforts offer a more chilling warning such as the 
Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The museum chronicles the events of 
the genocide at a former school turned torture center, having guests walk through the exact 
rooms Cambodians were imprisoned. Countries like Argentina and have created several 
memorials in a variety of forms from monuments, street names, and also activities of 
remembrance such as its annual March 24 demonstrations, which remembers the day the military 
junta began.213  
 Despite these benefits of memorialization, some scholars fear memory can be dangerous. 
Andrew Rigby warns, “Too great a concern with remembering the past can mean that the 
divisions and conflicts of old never die, the wounds are never healed. In such circumstances the 
past continues to dominate the present, and hence to some degree determines the future.”214 In 
addition to Rigby’s concern that if too much pressure is on remembering the past and not moving 
forward, memory can also be arbitrary because of its selective nature. Memories are not concrete 
and misguided perceptions could fester into future generations.215  
 Memorialization efforts prove not to be simple endeavors, and might take several years to 
implement due to disagreements. Individuals can disagree on whether or not memorials honor 
the victims appropriately or not, a primary example being the Vietnam memorial. Further, the 
way historical events are portrayed in memorial efforts is highly debatable as seen with the 	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Enola Gay controversy in the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum. These concerns 
transition directly on how history text books for future generations should describe the past. 
Along with memory come strong sentiments as Cohen states memory wars emerge, as 
individuals challenge appropriate accounts of the past. With these battles, Cohen writes: “statues 
are pulled down, street names changed, and public holidays abolished.”216 While highly 
contestable and potentially destructive, memory battles are important to engage in as they work 
on honoring the past, and figuring a collective memory for the new state.  
 
Transitional Justice Working for a Transitional State  
While not completely exhaustive, all these potential methods of transitional justice 
provide potential options for a transitional nation-state to explore post-conflict. Societies 
emerging from prolonged, lengthy conflicts need a way to grapple with the embittered residue 
entrenched throughout the nation-state. A possible method to mediate, or a combination of these 
transitional justice methods, provides “a process through which a society moves from a divided 
past to a shared future.”217 Policymakers and activists have stressed the importance of utilizing 
either one or a combination of these practices in order to mend the “wounds” of society. Ideally, 
by engaging with these practices it hopes to avoid: 
A history of unaddressed massive abuses is likely to be socially divisive, to generate 
mistrust between groups and in the institutions of the State, and to hamper or slow 
down the achievement of security and development goals. It raises questions about the 
commitment to the rule of law and, ultimately, can lead to cyclical recurrence of 
violence in various forms.218 
 
Even though there are direct benefits from transitional justice, some scholars disagree heavily on 
engaging in transitional justice practices at all. Baglione classifies this school of thought as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Cohen, States of Denial, 234.  
217 Bloomfield et al., Reconciliation After Violent Conflict, 12. 	  
218 ICTJ, “What is Transitional Justice?” 
60	  	  
“Traditionalism.” Traditionalists avoid focusing on memory and accountability after conflict and 
instead emphasizes on “institution- and coalition building as the most important strategies for 
stabilizing post-war societies.”219 Traditionalists warn that seeking the truth and engaging in 
justice practices prevents a steady trajectory towards peace as justice. Besides impeding the 
peace process, at the core of the disagreement with transitional justice for Traditionalists is the 
fact that the term “Reconciliation” often accompanies these measures. To many, “reconciliation 
can be offensive as it contains religious undertones and could potentially suggest that victims 
need to “forgive” their perpetrators and they believe that it could be used “as an excuse to belittle 
or ignore their suffering.”220 Traditionalists and Reconciliationists do not disagree on all 
accounts, as they “agree on the long-term nature of the peacebuilding process, the tenacity of 
violence in this period, the danger of equating democracy with elections, and the importance of 
creating an efficacious state.”221 Because of the similarities and ultimate end goals of peace, a 
combination of the schools of thought would work well in conversation together, despite 
concrete differences.  
Ignoring the past does not solve the extreme embittering sentiments left post-conflict. It is 
an extremely worthwhile process to engage in transitional justice methods as these sentiments 
could manifest into future conflict. Reconciliation does not have to follow the meaning of 
“complete forgiveness.” It instead offers a way for, “finding a way to live alongside former 
enemies—not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to 
coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, 
so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately.”222 
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Expanding on the end goal of “Reconciliation” from the Handbook to Reconciliation, I 
move away from the definition of reconciliation in that it works to completely mend the 
relationships between former enemies. These hostilities are deeply rooted, and rightfully so. 
They are not going to go away overnight. It is important to work towards the efforts transitional 
justice works as a hopeful goal, something that likely will not be achieved in full capacity. 
By directly addressing past massive abuses, transitional justice aims to build support in 
societies along lines of trust. Without addressing these issues, transitional governments are built 
on lies, denial, and impunity. By combatting these issues results in “stable and just peace, one 
that will weather—without violence, political differences of opinion that are bound to emerge as 
citizens lives together.”223 However, these practices are going to come with time and these 
practices are not going to be perfect. It is all part of a transitional process working step by step to 
heal these “wounds” from conflict and post-authoritarian rule.  
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Nepal and the CPN-M 
 
If you really wanted your rights 
Why did you have to get a gun? 
If you really wanted your rights 
Why did you have to kill your 
brothers? 
If you really wanted equality 
Why did you have to use a bullet? 
Maha Prasad Subedi 
Khotang224 
 
 Maha Prasad Subedi, a Nepalese elementary student, reflects on the remorseful feelings 
some Nepalese citizens felt after viewing a photo gallery of images from the civil war between 
the Nepalese government and the insurgent group known as the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist), or CPN-M. The violent conflict between these two actors engulfed the state of Nepal 
from 1996-2006. Tragically, a significant amount of non-combatants and innocent civilians were 
caught in the crossfire between the two forces, with the lower castes representing most of the 
victims. At the culmination of the conflict in 2006, there were roughly 15,000 causalities and 
1,350 enforced disappearances, hundreds of torture victims, and about 100,000 to 250,000 were 
displaced from their homes.225 Today, the “disappeared” individuals remain unaccounted for, and 
survivors still seek answers.  
Though almost ten years have passed since the end of the conflict, the Nepalese state has 
made little progress in transitional justice measures to mediate these “wounds” from the conflict. 
Largely, the current political situation of Nepal contributes to the lack of progress in addressing 
past human rights violations from both sides of the conflict. In order to thoroughly contextualize 	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both the issues in Nepal’s internal war and its post-conflict process, several components will be 
explored throughout this case study. The background with the conflict itself will include: factors 
leading up to insurgency, the rise of the CPN-M insurgency as a threat to the Nepali state, and 
Nepal’s counterinsurgency movement to protect its monopoly of violence. Finally, Nepal’s 
experience with transitional justice measures will be explored. 
 
Background Leading up to the Insurgency  
 Often regarded as a regarded as a “Zone of Peace,” analysts assumed Nepal unlikely to 
ever have violence erupt within its borders. The fact that Nepal has avoided any form of conflict 
since the Anglo-Nepal wars in 1816 contributes significantly to this assumption.226  Yet, on 
February 13th 1996, Nepal proved to the world that it was not immune to combat with the 
declaration of a “People’s War.”227 While shocking, the civil war brought to the surface various 
underlying grievances which have frustrated marginalized Nepalese for years. The root causes of 
the civil war “could be regarded as the outcome of a combination of political, economic, social, 
and historical factors.”228 The Maoist insurgency sparked a fire, a fire which could have been 
ignited decades ago.   
 Nepal has existed as an authoritarian state for most of its existence, as only recently has 
the state shifted to more democratic practices. The monarchy, in power from 1749 to 1951, 
dominated all political authority in Nepal. Within the monarchic system, Nepal witnessed several 
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shifts in power from the Shah dynasty to the Rana family.229 In 1951, Nepali politics changed 
dramatically with an emphasis on democracy. This shift toward democracy came when the Shah 
dynasty gained back monarchial power and “the political system that emerged after 1950 was a 
liberal democracy under the aegis of a constitutional monarch.”230 However, introducing 
democracy to the formally autocratic country ended up being extremely more arduous than 
anticipated.  
In 1959, Nepal participated in its first parliamentary elections. In these elections, nine 
different political parties formed and ran in opposition to each other. While the Nepalese 
Congress Party (NCP) won by a huge victory, King Mahendra immediately rejected this victory 
by repealing the Constitution and breaking up the multiple political party system completely. All 
democracy efforts ended with the Panchayat system as it declared political parties illegal. The 
following decade was marked by political dissatisfaction as opposition parties to the Panchayat 
system started leading anti-governmental protests. These protests suggested tremendous 
discontent among Nepalese, resulting in a shift towards a new “democratic era.”231 After 
witnessing revolutions in Nepal, King Birenda decided to “start an era of constitutional 
monarchy and multiparty democracy in Nepal.”232 Despite transitioning to free elections in the 
1990s and ending the Panchayat system, discontent remained.  
This discontent among Nepalese spurred from a variety of frustrations. Democratization 
failed as viable solution for solving Nepal’s political problems. Instead of being concerned with 
actually improving Nepal, Nepali politicians were “deeply embroiled in personalized internal 	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party battles.”233 The politicians also represented a limited scope of the Nepali population, as 
most of the political leaders were part of the Brahmin and Chhetri caste groups and from the 
professional working class. It soon became evident that these leaders were rooted in the nepotism 
of the Kathmandu elite from higher castes, paying little regard for the grievances of the 
population outside of Kathmandu.234 While the monarchy did not have as much power as before, 
the king evidently was cynical about the political parties and became increasingly closer to the 
military. Along with this limited representation, came practices rooted in corruption.  
The new open political system’s corruption came directly from the practices of the 
Panchayat years. Both commissions and bribes plagued the Panchayat system, and it transitioned 
directly into the campaigns of the new politicians.235 As mentioned, the small elite group of the 
Chhetri and Bahuns castes composed Nepali politicians. Even though these castes only 
represented between 16 and 13 percent of the population respectfully, they dominated top 
positions in civil services and were extremely well off economically.236 Based on the limited 
representation of the population, Nepalese who did not belong to these specific castes felt 
increasingly marginalized.  Marginalized Nepalese included lower castes, women, and those not 
residing in urban areas lacking the same level of access to development. In addition to severe 
corruption, The Nepali state proved its political weakness in other avenues as the state had 
“power-centric intraparty and interparty conflicts, poorly institutionalized political bodies, and 
ineffective leadership.”237 
Adding to extreme political exclusion, the Nepali state’s economic situation also 
influenced some of the population to resort to violence. In 2001, the Nepali state ranked amongst 	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the lowest nations in the United Nation Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Human 
Development Index (HDI) category of “Inequality in income or consumption”.238 The UNDP 
placed the Nepali state in the lowest classification of “low human development” ranking the state 
129 out of 162 states. This low ranking resembles data from the HDI in early 1990. Along with a 
low human development score, Nepal had “a gross domestic product per capita of $896, life 
expectancy at birth of 52.5 years, and an adult literacy rate of 25.6 percent.”239 Few employment 
opportunities for a large young population allowed the Maoists to recruit manpower. Before the 
insurgency, the poor represented 42 percent of the 23 million Nepalese population.240 Along with 
poverty, those living in the poorest areas of the country “also have the lowest access to education 
and basic health services, highest rates of infant mortality, and highest rates of child 
malnutrition.”241 Due to these circumstances, the Nepali state possessed many of the 
characteristics which make a state conducive for escalating to a situation of violent conflict.  
 
CPN-M: A “Successful Insurgency”  
As established in Chapter One, disparities of poverty and political, social, and economic 
undercurrents cultivate conflict in seemingly peaceful states. Prior to the conflict, Nepal certainly 
possessed these inequalities, allowing for the rise of the CPN-M insurgency. Not only was the 
eruption of violence surprising, but also the insurgency ended up being tremendously successful, 
as analysts now regard the CPN-M one of history’s most successful insurgency movements.242  
By declaring a “People’s War,” the Maoists finally offered marginalized Nepalese a voice for 
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their grievances. As previously mentioned in the last section, grievances such as “The exclusion 
of citizens, a feudal ruling structure with its links to the military, Kathmandu’s apathy and 
neglect for the rest of the country, an expanding population forced to share limited resources, and 
millions of youth without opportunities,” made an insurrection conducive.243 The insurgency 
began when the political party, the United People’s Front Nepal (UPF), split into two factions 
after reaching a breaking point with these frustrations.244 Puspa Kamal Dahal, commonly known 
as Prachanda, decided to boycott elections for the year and instead begin an armed uprising, 
resorting to violence to achieve his political goals. Prachanda renamed his faction and supporters 
of UPF to the Communist Party of Nepal. His slogan, “Let us march ahead on the path of 
struggle towards establishing the people’s rule by wreaking the reactionary ruling system of 
state.” 245 Immediately after splitting into a separate faction, the CPN-M presented a detailed list 
of forty demands to the Kathmandu based government.246 Some of the demands “called for an 
end to the domination of foreign powers, such as India; a secular state, with the monarchy 
stripped of its privileges; and a wider range of social and economic reforms.”247 Along with the 
demands, the CPN declared that it would form its own army under the name, the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and launch its armed movement on February 17th 1996.248   
Initially, CPN-M targeted most of their violence at government officials, or individuals 
associated with the Nepalese government. Human Rights Watch claimed, “The Maoists have 
assassinated or executed suspected government informants, local political activists and non-
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Maoist party officials.”249 The report also claims that the CPN-M specifically targeted police 
officers. Besides focusing on more governmental office related individuals, the Maoists also 
inflicted crimes against innocent Nepalese.  
Despite using these tactics against innocent Nepalese, the Maoists still mobilized 
significant support for the insurgency. What started with a few dozen fighters in 1996, ended up 
magnifying up to 30,000 fighters at the peak of the conflict.250 The CPN-M strategically worked 
with its resources and targeted particular individuals using propaganda tactics to generate 
support. For example, in villages, they would conduct mass gatherings and send out door-to-door 
motivators.251 In these mass gatherings, the Maoists appealed to villagers by altering traditional 
cultural practices of dancing and music with Maoist ideology. Using these cultural practices, 
they could portray their ideology in a way to convince individuals to join the movement. As 
established earlier, there is a strong correlation between violence and poverty. Nepal represented 
no exception to this as Harald Olav Skar reiterates, “Promising a better and more egalitarian 
society in one of the poorest countries in Asia has certain strategic advantages, as the potential 
recruitment base is large.”252 Therefore, the Maoists easily mobilized disgruntled villagers with 
these propaganda tactics.  
The Maoists needed to appeal to the rest of Nepal besides just the villagers in rural Nepal. 
Therefore, the CPN-M produced pamphlets, newspapers, and magazines for more literate 
Nepalese in efforts to generate support with upper middle class Nepalese who did not identify 
with some of these concerns.253 The Maoists gave women trapped in a patriarchal society a 
plethora of options to get involved in military ranks where before they had faced structural 	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violence from the state and family life. The CPN-M argued, “women and gender equality can 
only be achieved in a classless communist society.”254 Finally, the Maoists appealed to students 
disgruntled with the lack of employment opportunities after school.  
 
Nepalese Counterinsurgency Plan 
Despite the growing insurgency in the countryside, the Nepalese government did not 
formally perceive the CPN-M as a legitimate threat until 2001 when the Maoists branched out 
from rural areas to more urban areas. At that point, the Maoists controlled roughly 70 percent of 
the countryside.255  It was only when the CPN-M began to affect lives of Nepalese in the center 
of the kingdom “that the Nepalese government attempted to control the flaring insurgency.”256 In 
part, the state did not respond to the threat of violence because violence of the Maoists only 
escalated in 2001 when the CPN-M announced “Prachandapath.”257 Prachandapath shifted the 
ideology of the CPN-M campaign by escalating the insurgency’s violence. The campaign 
combined both the Russian model of armed insurrection coupled with the Chinese model of 
protracted warfare. By engaging in these behaviors, the Nepalese security forces needed to 
respond critically as these efforts were particularly ruthless and more difficult to end.258 
The Nepalese state soon demonstrated its willingness to end the threat of the insurgency. 
The army itself was extremely bloodthirsty, killing any civilians suspected as Maoist 
sympathizers. State repression particularly proliferated when the government declared a state of 
emergency in 2001. The state of emergency granted the Royal Nepalese Army complete military 
impunity. Granting impunity for military forces encouraged violations, which manifested in 	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Nepal’s counterinsurgency efforts. The state appeared willing to engage in any practices 
necessary to end the terrorist tactics of the Maoists. Violence escalated in 2005 after King 
Gyanendra announced the enforcement of a coup against the civilian government in February of 
that year, deeming the coup necessary to end the nine-year-old insurgency.259 With King 
Gyanendra’s coup, came a surge of human rights violations. 
 
Human Rights Violations  
 Throughout the conflict, both forces displayed grave violations of human rights against 
innocent civilians, displaying little regard for international law and engaged in unjust war 
practices.  
For example, the Maoists would engage in military tactics causing unnecessary casualties 
for civilians. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report in 2006 claims that the Maoists engaged in 
practices such as, “extortion, murder, forced displacement of civilians, and abductions.”260 
Besides these violations, the Maoists also forcibly abducted students directly from schools in 
order to sway them to the Maoist side. HRW and other human rights organizations’ 
investigations discovered that the CPN-M used children as spies, couriers, and messengers.261 
In response, the security forces far surpassed necessary aggression in war to combat the 
Maoists. An Amnesty International report in 2003 reiterated that despite the Maoist’s violation of 
human rights, the “most transgressions had been by the Royal Nepalese Army, and that Nepal 
now held the world record in human disappearances.”262 The Nepalese Government engaged in 
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thousands of unlawful killings of civilians as well as practiced torture and arbitrary arrests of any 
suspected insurgents.  
 
End of the Conflict 
 The decade of conflict officially came to an end in November 2006 when the two sides 
signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).263 The conflict between Nepali security 
forces and the Maoists represents a peculiar case as neither side officially accomplished a 
“victory” over the other and instead came to a truce. While both sides viciously battled each 
other, the state disorganized and invited the Maoists to join the government, creating a 
representative democracy.  
The Nepalese government could have taken the route of other states in suppressing the 
insurgency with extreme force and brutality. However, the extreme popularity of the Maoists and 
growing disillusionment with the monarchy allowed for this outcome. The Royal Massacre in 
2001 shattered many Nepalese’s faith in the monarchial system. As soon as Prince Dipendra 
murdered the entire royal family, many Nepalese grew critical of the monarchy, abandoning 
feelings of high esteem. The replacement king, King Gyanendra, ended up being extremely 
unpopular partially for a conspiracy theory that he set up the massacre as well as his corrupt 
practices regarding money and disregard for political parties.264 These conditions directly 
contributed to the acceptance of the CPA.  
The creation of the CPA, “declared the beginning of a new peaceful co-operation 
between the government and the Maoists, guaranteeing sovereignty, progressive political 
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resolution, democratic reform of the state and social and economic transformation.”265 The CPA 
established democratic elections for June 2007, ensuring representation from the CPN-M.266 
 
Transitional Justice Measures 
Along with ensuring a ceasefire of violence between the two forces and setting up 
elections, the CPA proposed recommendations which included transitional justice practices. 
Within the CPA, both parties aspired to end human rights violations in the country and made 
vows to end impunity and protect the rights of the disappeared.267 Yet, almost nine years since 
the CPA, little progress has been made in ensuring effective justice measures and efforts have 
been inconsistent. Accountability is imperative as, “the failure to punish the perpetrators of these 
crimes has perpetuated an environment in which violations continue to be committed with 
impunity.”268 Because of this hostile environment, impunity needs to be broken down.   
The political reality in Nepal principally impedes on the exploration of particular 
transitional practices. Since both forces currently are in the government and hold high positions 
of power, it remains unlikely, at least any time soon, retributive justice will hold human rights 
violators accountable for their crimes.  
While retributive justice is extremely unlikely in Nepal, other transitional justice 
measures such as truth commissions and reparations for the victims are considerably more 
probable. In fact, the CPA in 2006 originally proposed four transitional justice measures:  
(i) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate serious 
violations of human rights and crimes against humanity 
(ii) the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission to provide assistance 
to conflict victims 	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(iii) a High-Level Inquiry Commission on Disappeared Citizens 
(iv) a High-Level State Restructuring Recommendation Commission269 
 
However, actually enforcing these suggestions has proved challenging. Up until 2014, several 
efforts to begin a truth commission have been thwarted as the “unconstitutional” by the Supreme 
Court. The case Madhav Kumar Basnet v Government of Nepal determined that the TRC 
ordinance in 2013, “obstructed transitional justice, violated both the Nepalese Constitution and 
international human rights law, and contravened previous Supreme Court orders.”270 Most of the 
critique behind the TRC in Nepal was that a state could directly interfere in the commission in 
that the commission’s members could be removed if they engaged in “bad conduct” or “lack of 
efficiency.”271 Furthermore, the TRC included an amnesty clause, allowing human rights abusers 
to continue to enjoy impunity. Recently, Nepal created a new act of the Commission on 
Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth, and Reconciliation. HRW advocates that the 
commission should be challenged for the inclusion of the amnesty clause.272  
 However, the insistence of removing the amnesty clause may be detrimental for victims. 
The Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) in Kathmandu warns that victim’s rights cannot be 
ignored as “64% of respondents said that finding out the truth about those who were forcibly 
disappeared was their top priority.”273 Families of the disappeared are forced to experience 
anxiety over not knowing the fate of their loved ones, and “the religious traditions carried out 
after death require human remains or proof of death; a mechanism without an amnesty clause can 
inhibit this closure.”274 The unwavering determination of human rights groups and other 
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countries to remove the amnesty clause may result in the truth about the disappeared taking years 
to surface. 
Overall, victim’s rights are at the heart of these efforts and need to be holistically 
addressed. Yet, while truth commission efforts have been inconsistent throughout the years, 
significant efforts have been made to give compensation to victims. Under the Interim Relief 
Program (IRP) in 2008, Nepal has given reparations “in the form of cash payments, scholarships, 
reimbursements of medical costs, compensation for “loss of” or “damage to” property, and skills 
training.”275 However, the IRP was never supposed to be a long-term program as “it has been 
anticipated that the responsibility for recommending reparations would rest with the long-
awaited Truth and Reconciliation Commission.”276 Ultimately, a TRC could recommend a more 
comprehensive reparation program to best aid victim’s needs.  
 Due to the resilient determinations of state officials in avoiding accountability, it is 
unlikely that justice will prevail in retributive form. HRW claimed in its recent World Report 
2015, “In spite of the new coalition government pledging to uphold long overdue promises of 
justice, accountability, and a new constitution, the Nepali government made virtually no 
discernable progress in any of these areas.”277 The international community and human rights 
groups are adamantly fighting against this situation as seen with the arrest of army Colonel 
Kumar Lama when he visited England in 2013. The United Kingdom charged Kumar Lama with 
two counts of torture by “‘inflicting severe pain or suffering’ as a public official on two separate 
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individuals.”278 Nepal claims that by arresting Lama, the United Kingdom is breaching its rights 
as a sovereign state and does not acknowledge any wrongdoing.  
Nepal needs to engage in issues of transitional justice. Engaging in an effective truth 
commission can potentially provide answers for victims and their families as well recommend 
appropriate reparation programs that are feasible for the government to hand out and improve the 
situation. 
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Sri Lanka and the LTTE 
We will not cave into pressures from any international quarters, locally and internationally, and 
will not stop until the war is completely over.279 
      -Former President Mahinda Rajapaksa  
        31 March 2009 
 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s statement on the 31st of March 2009 demonstrates the 
willingness the Sri Lankan government had to take any necessary measures to end the internal 
conflict between its armed forces and the insurgent group of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE). Rajapaksa and the government engaged in any possible counterinsurgency 
measures to combat terrorism in Sri Lanka. The United Nations estimates that 100,000 deaths 
accumulated over the four-decade long civil war on the island located off of India.280 In the final 
five months of the conflict, the government mercilessly destroyed the Tigers along with trapped 
civilians, paying little consideration for international human right standards. While Sri Lanka’s 
response was extreme, the government needed to respond to the considerable threat of the LTTE 
as the Tigers themselves engaged in terrorist tactics to accomplish their political aims. The 
events leading up to this decision of such magnitude were extremely complex and need to be 
thoroughly explored. Since the end of the conflict, the international community has pressed the 
government to tackle issues of transitional justice to investigate war crimes by both sides. Thus 
far, the future of transitional justice measures in Sri Lanka is grim, as the government has 
avoided any measures of accountability. However, a shocking new election in the state provides 
some hope for the potential progression of transitional justice in Sri Lanka.  
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Background: Sri Lanka’s Legacy of Colonialism  
 Since Sri Lanka’s government operated as a democracy, it could be assumed that 
intrastate conflict could have been largely avoided as popular grievances could have been 
addressed with democratic practices. However, the democracy largely only accounted for the 
majority population, the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese won majority rule in post-colonialism 
elections in 1948. Their victory is largely attributed to the fact that they represented roughly 75 
percent of the population, while other minorities composed the rest with the Tamils accounting 
for just ten percent of the population. The Tamils are an ethnic class in Sri Lanka, who descend 
from darker-skinned Dravidian migrants in south India, speak Tamil, and live in the northern and 
eastern provinces of the island. The Sinhalese embody almost a polar opposite characteristics 
contrasting in “geographic, racial, linguistic, and religious” qualities.281 Differing from the 
Tamils, the Sinhalese mostly reside in the southwest portion of the island, have roots with the 
Northern Indian Aryan peoples, practice Theravada Buddhism, and speak the Sinhala 
language.282 Post-colonialism, these ethnic differences were manifested and divided the two 
groups further apart.  
The legacy of colonialism in Sri Lanka sprouted the necessary conditions for internal 
conflict by proliferating the divide between these two groups. Colonialism on the island began 
with the Portuguese in 1595 when they conquered the island of Ceylon, now known as Sri 
Lanka.283 The Dutch ruled Ceylon as two separate ethnic territories, causing virtual isolation 
between the Tamils and Sinhalese. However, when the British replaced Dutch rule in 1802, they 
brought the two ethnicities back together, manifesting the divide. The British created a system of 
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minority dominance over the majority, following the steps of other colonial powers like 
Belgium’s decision to rule Rwanda by Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority. By having the 
Tamils dominate the majority class of the Sinhalese, it allowed Britain to maintain more control 
over the colony. With this dominance, came great rewards for the Tamils. For instance, the 
Tamils composed most of the government’s civil service in positions such as civil servants, 
lawyers, teachers, and doctors.284 Over the years, these privileges that the Tamils reaped from 
British colonial rule, steadily infuriated the Sinhalese.  
On February 4th, 1948, Sri Lanka peacefully experienced a transition from colonial rule 
when Britain’s colonial influence began dissolving in India.285 After acquiring independence, Sri 
Lanka switched to majoritarian political rule by holding elections. Immediately after 
independence, the Sinhalese won a fair election, gaining about 80 percent of the seats in 
Parliament. The elections themselves were legitimate as “they were achieved in a legal, 
transparent manner through both popular and parliamentary votes that achieved substantial 
minorities.”286 With this newfound political power, the Sinhalese created a relatively sound 
government. In hindsight, literacy rates were dramatically improving and the government itself 
was doing considerably well.  
Besides enacting positive changes in the government, the Sinhalese seemingly “got their 
revenge” from the lack of opportunities they experienced during British colonial rule. Their new 
acts resulted in extreme anger from the Tamils, who were used to being in positions of high 
power. The new governmental practices “were designed to redress the imbalances that favored 
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Tamils during the colonial period.”287 The first measure was the Sinhalese-Only Act of 1956, 
which declared the Sinhala language as Sri Lanka’s official language.288 While the act and other 
laws began as ways to protect Theravada Buddhism and the Sinhala language, these laws 
prompted further ostracizing legislation for the Tamils. For example, the 1970s practice of 
“standardization” made it extremely difficult for Tamil university applicants to gain admittance 
to universities, as the schools required them to have disproportionally higher exam results than 
Sinhalese applicants.289 
The Tamils progressively became enraged by these reforms which marginalized them as 
the reforms dramatically uprooted the system that older generations of Tamils had enjoyed 
throughout colonialism. With bleak hopes in the economy and education becoming more 
difficult to attain, “upper-, middle-, and lower-class Tamil men developed a collective sense of 
hopelessness for their future.”290 Adding to this strife, protests against this legislation by Tamils 
resulted in bouts of anti-Tamil violence at the hands of Sinhalese mobs.291 
 
The Emergence of the LTTE 
 The steady accumulation of anger over the years from the Tamils encouraged the 
possibility of LTTE rising and generating support. Working off the aggravations of infuriated 
young Tamils, Velupillai Prabhakarani created a potential solution with the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam in 1972, determining that violence was the only answer to alleviate their 
grievances. While the LTTE had initial humble beginnings, it escalated from just 30 rebels with 
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limited arms to “one of the world’s foremost paramilitary groups by 1991.”292 Along with being 
one of the more ruthless insurgency groups, the LTTE had the equipment to go with it: “with 
tanks, artillery, naval and air wings, and spies and sleeper suicide bombers planted all over the 
island.”293 By engaging in violent and terroristic tactics, the Tamils ruthlessly posed a serious 
threat to the safety of innocent civilians within the state.  
Certainly not all Tamils supported the LTTE’s insistence of violence, but significant 
amounts of Tamils did support the possibility of gaining independence from Sinhalese rule. 
Various Tamil groups expressed their grievances in Thumpu, Bhutan in July of 1985, advocating 
for: 
recognition of the Tamil people as a distinct nationality; guarantee of the 
territorial integrity of an independent Tamil homeland; recognition of the 
inalienable right of the Tamil nation to self-determination; and safeguards of the 
fundamental rights of the Tamil people outside the independent Tamil 
homeland294 
 
 
The LTTE convinced a significant amount of Tamils that violence offered a solution to finally 
acquire these goals of autonomy and self-determination. The LTTE’s original goal was for the 
creation of a separate state and to secure a national homeland located in the North and the East of 
Sri Lanka. The LTTE determined it was seemingly impossible for the Tamils and Sinhalese to 
coexist together and that “The features of Sinhala state oppression clearly indicate a devious plan 
calculated to destroy the national identity of the Tamil people.”295 Over time, the ultimate goals 
of the insurgency shifted from this strict objective for a completely independent state as it 
became apparent that it would be improbable.  	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 Prabhakaran and the LTTE possessed similiar components of Marxist insurgencies in that 
it engaged in guerilla practices and terrorism. The LTTE engaged in terrorist behaviors such as 
suicide bombings and other attacks. Thomas A. Marks distinguishes that, “Far from any attempt 
to avoid casualties, there was an effort to maximize those affected. This was terrorism, but it 
remained dedicated to consolidation and expansion of the counter-state, to terrorism as a method 
of action as opposed to a logic of action.”296 
 
LTTE’s Challenge to the State 
 The LTTE posed a direct threat to the legitimacy of the state of Sri Lanka, both in the 
insurgency’s insistence with creating an independent state and the use of terror tactics. The 
LTTE’s persistence of creating an independent state in Sri Lanka enticed deep concern amongst 
the Sinhalese. At the center of their concern, was the island’s close proximity to India since India 
houses a huge population of Tamil. Roughly 60 million Hindu Tamils currently live in the 
southern state of Tamil Nadu.297 If the LTTE succeeded in gaining independence as a separate 
state, the Tamil diaspora would largely support their interests. With such a close proximity to 
India, the power of Sri Lanka as a state could be significantly challenged. Besides the threat of 
secession breaking up the state as a collective, the LTTE’s use of violence and terror tactics 
directly challenged the government’s control of the monopoly of violence. The terrorist attacks 
were extremely destructive as well as successful with completed political assassinations.  
Due to the severity of the situation with the Tamil Tigers, the Sri Lankan government 
needed to generate a response to protect civilians as these terrorist tactics victimized innocent 
civilians. The aggressive nature of the Tamils resulted in the world regarding the rebels as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 Art and Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism, 486. 
297 Brendan O’Duffy, “LTTE: Majoritarianism, Self-Determination, and Military-to-Political Transition in Sri 
Lanka,”258 . 	  
82	  	  
brutal terrorist group, allowing Sri Lanka to justify its counterinsurgency strategies as part of the 
global “war on terror.” 298 By labeling the ethnic conflict as such, Marks warns that, “a focus on 
rooting out ‘the terrorists,’ as opposed to emphasizing political solutions to sources of conflict, 
often leads to abuse of the populace.”299  
  Throughout the years, the Sri Lankan government tried ending the influence of the 
Tigers, with little success.  After a series of cease fires and LTTE breaches of the cease fires by 
continuing to commit terrorist acts during them, the government responded with the “Sri Lankan 
Option,” which offered an easy solution to squash Tamil opposition by taking any military needs 
necessary. Brigadier-General Shavendra Silva claimed on February 23rd 2009: “We have a job to 
do. We are not bothered about any truce at the moment.”300 Disregarding any potential to 
politically work on the situation with the LTTE, the government instead took a completely 
militaristic approach. An inherent problem with this military approach was that it resulted in the 
government engaging in extreme violations of international law. Sri Lanka used “scorched-earth 
tactics, blurring the distinction between civilians and combatants, and enforcing a media 
blackout.”301 While both sides engaged in violations of war crimes, the government’s final 
offensive to destroy all aspects of the LTTE in 2009 represents particularly inexcusable behavior. 
While the behavior was inexcusable, the behavior was successful as it ended with a victory over 
the LTTE on May 19th, 2009.  
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War Crimes During the Conflict  
Particularly in the last months of the conflict, both the LTTE and the government are 
allegedly guilty of war crimes. LTTE forcibly recruited child soldiers throughout the insurgency, 
and in the last moments of the war, insurgents used hundreds of thousands of civilians as human 
shields in combat.302 An International Crisis Report produced this statement in the midst of the 
conflict: 
While the government and LTTE - and their vigorous online supporters - try to blame the 
other side for the current carnage, such accusations lead nowhere. The fact is, both sides 
are at fault, and both sides are almost certainly guilty of war crimes. The international 
community needs to put all possible pressure on the parties to end this madness, which is 
only causing extreme suffering among the civilian population303 
 
However, the Sri Lankan government far surpassed those of the Tamil Tigers as they engaged in 
behaviors on a much grander scale. By nature, the government has access to far more means of 
violence than the LTTE and should have engaged in a fair fight that would not have resulted in 
the loss of lives of so many civilians. 
Throughout the conflict, the United Nations and other human rights groups urged the 
government to stop using heavy weaponry. Yet, the government ignored these requests, 
determined to bring an end to the LTTE. A Human Rights Watch report in 2010 accounts, 
“Government forces repeatedly and indiscriminately shelled densely populated areas, sometimes 
using heavy artillery and other area weapons incapable of distinguishing between civilians and 
combatants.”304 Disturbingly, the government sectioned off specific areas as “no-fire zones” and 
“safe zones” but kept firing on these areas anyway, unnecessarily harming innocent civilians 
caught in the middle. Escalating suffering was the government’s decision to ban all humanitarian 	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aid groups and human rights organizations in war zones causing civilians trapped in war zones to 
be without necessary survival means such as water, food, and shelter. In the last five months 
alone, the UN approximates that 7,000 people were killed and at least 13,000 injured.305 While 
both sides inflicted grave human rights violations, the government inflicted severe crimes that 
were effectively disproportionate to the Tamil Tigers.  
 
Denial and Lack of Accountability  
 As mentioned, the 26-year conflict between Sri Lanka security forces and the LTTE 
finally came to an end in 2009 with the Sri Lankan government declaring military victory. For 
years the political condition in Sri Lanka limited engaging in transitional justice options. While 
in office, President Rajapaksa took significant measures to avoid all accountability 
investigations. Recently, the UN has proposed a new investigation with OHCHR (Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights) concerning the human rights abuses enacted by both the 
government and the Tigers. While in power, Rajapaksa routinely rejected these efforts, refusing 
“to grant visas to the UN investigators, and said only Sri Lankans could conduct such an 
inquiry.”306 Based on the way Sri Lanka has handled issues from the conflict, it is unlikely that 
these investigations would be completely holistic.  
 Sri Lanka’s current denial practices have directly transitioned from its practice of denying 
during the conflict. In the midst of the final offensive a report claims, “The government has 
denied harming Tamil civilians, and has ruthlessly moved against anyone who challenges the 
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official line.”307 The documentary No Fire Zone by Callum Macrae shows explicit footage of 
human rights violations that directly conflict with the Geneva Convention. Included in the 
footage were executions of LTTE soldiers after they surrendered.308 Joshua Hammer in “ The 
Terrible War for Sri Lanka,” accounts that this exact “footage has been labeled fake by the Sri 
Lankan government, yet it is authenticated by forensic pathologists.”309 By labeling concrete 
footage as fake, the government clearly engages in the same denial practices Cohen explores in 
States of Denial. HRW attests, “The government's refusal to address accountability for serious 
abuses continues a longstanding pattern of impunity for rights violations by state security 
forces.”310 The government’s denial of the footage proves indicative of the adamant nature of its 
insistence on ignoring accountability for crimes against humanity. 
A major barrier preventing addressing impunity issues in Sri Lanka, is that oftentimes 
human rights lawyers, journalists, and aid workers are labeled as sympathizers with the LTTE, 
and proponents of terrorism.311 The Sri Lankan government can easily label all challengers with 
this label, making it difficult for any change to transpire. In addition to a lack of justice for the 
government’s actions, LTTE leaders have not been subject to investigation. The International 
Crisis Group (ICG) explains the lack of prosecutions for LTTE leaders, “in part because of their 
reliance on suicide attacks but also because of the failures of the justice system.”312 A lack of 
accountability and ignoring the festering wounds from the conflict poses several inherent issues 
with negative repercussions for Sri Lanka as well as other international states. 	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One of the most pressing consequences of ignoring accountability and avoiding either 
retributive or restorative justice is that victims may take revenge in their own hands. Engaging in 
revenge may sprout new violence. TCG claims: 
The defeat of the LTTE has left many shocked and directionless; as yet it is unclear 
whether the inchoate fury and sense of humiliation will coalesce into a renewed support 
for violence. If it did, it would only take a small portion of the diaspora to fund and 
propagate a new insurgency313 
 
 
As the TGC suggests, the large Tamil diaspora population could easily fund and support a new 
insurgency. As established earlier, the southern state of Tamil Nadu in India comprises a huge 
number of Tamils, which is located in extreme close proximity to the island. Tamils are not 
limited to India, as a quarter million of Tamils also live abroad.314 These compose the same 
Tamils who proved willing to fund insurgency in the past. Therefore, it is not outlandish that 
there could be a reemergence of a violent insurgency in Sri Lanka.  Addressing accountability 
from the conflict offers some mediation for preventing the diaspora from seeking revenge.  
 Another major concern with allowing Sri Lanka to have zero accountability for war 
crimes is that it encourages other state dealing with ethnic differences to use Sri Lanka’s 
approach as a model of counterterrorism. Especially troublesome is how “other countries with 
ethnic problems have been studying Sri Lanka’s approach—the Burmese military, the Thais and 
the Bangladeshis, for example.”315 While Sri Lanka successfully crushed all opposition the LTTE 
posed, their ultimate efforts were unjustifiable. If the international community fails to make 
officials experience no accountability for their actions, it just allows similar atrocities of this 
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nature to occur in the future. The ICG confirms, “The ‘Sri Lankan model’ of counter-insurgency 
sets a dangerous precedent that should be rejected clearly.”316 
In the near future, Sri Lanka needs to formulate an appropriate form of justice to keep 
several issues at bay. The future of Sri Lanka is in a fragile place as, “The truth of what 
happened during the course of the war, especially in its last months, must be established if 
Tamils and Sinhalese are to live as equal citizens.”317 The way the Sri Lanka government 
defeated the LTTE ignores the root grievances of what sprouted the conflict itself.  
Thus far, Sri Lanka began an internal investigation with the Lessons Learned and 
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).318 An intrinsic problem with LLRC is that on the board of 
the commission were “governmental officials who’d publicly defended Sri Lanka against 
accusations of war crimes – a serious conflict of interest.”319 The fact that these generals were on 
the board is indicative in the reports as they place most of the blame of their own crimes of 
harming civilians as the faults of rebels. Therefore, international investigations offer the only 
feasible solution of discovering the facts from the conflict, in the most unbiased way possible.320 
In terms of feasible justice measures, the UN Security Council would likely be the only viable 
force to prosecute senior government officials. The Security Council could replicate an ad hoc 
criminal tribunal like in Yugoslavia, but China and Russia’s continue to veto any efforts. Based 
on the reluctance to engage in any behaviors of addressing the past, these efforts may take a 
considerable amount of time.  
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Are the Tides Changing in Sri Lanka? 
President Rajapksa’s decade long political reign over Sri Lanka has discouraged any 
exploration for accountability and challenging impunity. However, due to a recent election, the 
transitional justice situation in Sri Lanka may dramatically change in the near future with the 
recent removal of Rajapaksa in January 2015. The election’s results shocked Sri Lanka, as it 
marks the closet election in nine years. 
 Opposition candidate Maithripala Sirisena won 51.28 percent of the vote against 
Rajapaksa.321 Sirisena, a former cabinet minister, is vowing to “limit the president’s executive 
powers, root out corruption and nepotism, and strengthen parliament and the judiciary.”322 
Overall, Siriensa has blatantly vocalized criticism of Rajapksa’s practices, making it promising 
that he may make significant progress in addressing alleged war crimes from the conflict. The 
new foreign minister, Mr. Samaraweera, told the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 
Washington in February that, “Unlike the previous government, we are not in a state of denial, 
saying that such violations have not happened.”323  
Since Sirisena’s election, the world has already witnessed tremendous changes, virtually 
impossible months before under Rajapatska’s rule. For example, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the 
former president’s brother, is currently forbidden from leaving the country pending 
investigations on his recent involvement with a ship carrying more than 3,000 weapons to the 
island.324 This travel restriction alone is monumental as it paves the way for potential future 
investigations against governmental authorities. Additionally, formally imprisoned Jeyakumari 	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Balendran, who was held for a year without bail for protesting enforced disappearances, was 
recently put on bail.325 It is likely that much more is to change in the coming months.  
 While these progresses are enormous, addressing the violations from the conflict itself 
may prove to be more difficult. As of March 12, 2015, Siriensa has confirmed that he will carry 
out a domestic inquiry for alleged war crimes, but will not allow outside investigators from the 
UN to aid the process. Furthermore, in a recent interview with Al- Jazeera, Siriensa explicitly 
denied the footage from No Fire Zone as legitimate.326 While it is progress that Siriensa agreed to 
engage in an inquiry concerning the war crimes in Sri Lanka, his explicit insistence that he does 
not believe in the war crimes claims from the documentary is troublesome. There may be 
progress in engaging in transitional justice, but if an inquiry is completely domestic, it poses the 
threat of being extremely biased.  	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Peru and the PCP-SL 
But the Peruvian case must also stand as a warning about the limitations of transitional justice. 
Much work remains to be done to persuade the people of Peru and many other countries that the 
extension of human rights to all citizens is more necessary than ever in the “age of terrorism” 
and to address fundamental inequalities before they erupt into violence 327 
 
  
 An internal struggle plagued Peru for roughly two decades, beginning in the early 1980s 
and fading out in the 1990s. During this time period, Peruvian security forces ruthlessly fought 
against internal terrorism threats. The Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL), or Shining Path, composed 
the most dominant force, waging a massive armed insurgency movement. Besides the PCP-SL, 
another subversive group, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), emerged as a 
secondary threat. The fight between these forces “had claimed at least 50,000 lives—most of 
them rural, uneducated, and poor.”328 Collectively, between these three actors, the two-armed 
insurgent groups and Peru’s coercive state agents, severe violations of human rights were 
committed, including extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and terrorism.  
In a similar fashion to Sri Lanka and Nepal, Peru persistently avoided acknowledging any 
form of accountability for its violations against international humanitarian law. The state covered 
up crimes with impunity measures and avoided conducting trials unless they indicted PCP-SL 
members. In contrast to the other case studies, Peru’s culture of impunity astonishingly came to 
an end in November 2000, with the collapse of Fujimori’s regime. The demise of Fujimori’s 
presidency, flagrant with abuse and corruption even post-conflict, finally opened up windows of 
opportunity to address human rights abuses during the conflict against the Sendero Luminoso, 
ten years after the cessation of violence.  
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Peru offers a concrete example of the full variety of options a state possesses in the 
aftermath of a violent insurgency. Due to their political circumstances, the other two case studies 
have significantly less options in engaging in potential transitional justice measures. Besides 
being the first state to ever extradite its own democratically elected leader for human rights 
abuses, “Peru has used virtually every tool in the transitional justice toolkit.”329 Such programs 
included: a truth and reconciliation commission, revoking official amnesties, apologies, and 
actual prosecutions of individual armed force members, guerilla fighters, and the government’s 
executive branch.330 While transitional efforts in Peru certainly were not flawless and without 
controversy, the Peruvian state accomplished monumental efforts by engaging thoroughly in 
transitional justice options. Based on the fact that the previous two case studies went into explicit 
detail concerning both the insurgencies and the counterinsurgency response, this case study 
summaries these occurrences and focuses more attention to the transitional justice measures that 
Fujimori’s fall permitted Peru to engage in.  
 
Contextual Background 
At the core of comprehending the conflict between the PCP-SL and the Peruvian 
government, is how divided Peru is as a country. Historians often explain that within Peru, exists 
two separate nations.331 As established in Chapter One, nations as an entity can at times be more 
unified and possess stronger sentiments of allegiance over the state they reside in. Negative 
sentiments can especially flourish if the state fails to provide necessary services and support to 
all members of society. These sentiments can manifest into something troublesome, challenging 
the authority of the state, as seen with the case in Peru. The mestizo population, or descendants 	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of both European and indigenous peoples, represent the first “nation” in Peru.332 Most of the 
population (excluding Peruvians living in the Amazonian region and the mainland) representing 
the first “nation,” resides in cities along the coast, such as the capital city of Lima. In contrast, 
the second “nation” of Peru lives throughout the Andean mountains, united by their Inca ancestry 
and their language, Quechua.333  
Since Peru’s independence from Spain on June 28th, 1821, the divide between these two 
nations has interfered in formulating a unified Peru. Largely, these conditions are byproducts 
from Peru’s colonial legacy. Spanish conquistadors established the divide when they conquered 
the Inca. Separating the indigenous from the rest of the state, the Spanish “established a pattern 
of neglecting the countryside and its people that would be followed long after independence.”334 
While one portion of Peru lives comfortably as middle class, the state denies the other side 
critical resources, causing the indigenous to live in an extremely underdeveloped world. The lack 
of access to the modern world further divides the inherent cultural differences between the 
Quechua highland people and the rest of Peru. The pattern of neglect carried on for centuries, as 
the government instead focused on Lima and the surrounding areas. The Peruvian governmental 
denied basic services as Root illustrates, “Children were more likely to die in infancy, to live 
without access to potable water, to grow up without entering a school room or encountering a 
police officer, and to suffer infectious disease.”335 Effectively, those living in the Andes were 
completely excluded from national development. 
When Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, waged the Sendero Luminoso insurgency, he appealed 
directly to these disparities the Quechua experienced for years. Guzmán convinced “this poor, 
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indigenous Peru that the other, bourgeois Peru was fundamentally corrupt and responsible for its 
miserable living conditions.”336 The Shining Path proposed an alternative for the indigenous 
population to no longer rely on the state that constantly failed them. Along with providing an 
ideal rebel base, the Andean highlands offered the perfect location, as it is deeply secluded from 
the rest of the country. Guzmán and the Shining Path leaders directly exploited the conditions of 
the indigenous in the Andes to their benefit, working towards PCP-SL’s end goal of destroying 
“the state and the vestiges of the corrupt, semifuedal, oligarchic society.”337  
As the insurgency progressed and became more violent, support for the PCP-SL wavered 
significantly. It quickly became apparent that the radical ideology behind the movement 
increasingly victimized their target “beneficiaries.”338 The peasants soon realized that the 
isolating nature of the ideology “related to neither its heritage nor its needs, and they 
compounded the negative effects of their efforts by using terror and intimidation to maintain 
local ‘support.’”339 Indigenous peasants became caught in crossfire, constantly victimized, 
particularly when the Peruvian government finally responded to insurgent threat.  
However, the government’s response came slow. Not until two years into the insurgency, 
did the Peruvian government respond to the Shining Path’s threat, as it was preoccupied with 
transitioning from a military coup ending in 1980. When the state formally acknowledged the 
threats, it overcompensated for its initial inaction. The military directly responded to Guzmán’s 
use of Maoist theory as: “Some generals spoke of inverting the Maoist dictum that a guerilla 
moves among the people like a fish in water. If this is so, they asserted, their duty is to drain the 
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sea.”340 This statement demonstrates the ruthless force the military was willing to use in order to 
end the threat of the Shining Path. Coupled with virtual impunity for their actions, the military 
enforced their strict campaign with little regard for the civilian population. 
President Fujimori defeated the Shining Path with his self-imposed coup, or autoglope, in 
1992. His ruthless plan of attack was accomplished because the autoglope “allowed the president 
to enact the counterinsurgency in its entirety.”341 The self-coup declared a state of emergency 
where Fujimori acquired dictatorial power over his own democratically elected government.342  
Under the state of emergency, the armed forces received “wide-ranging protections for military 
prerogatives, effective immunity from prosecution, new limitations on press reporting on 
military operations, and further expansion of military powers.”343 The intense shift of aggression 
effectively ended the influence of the Shining Path in just a few short years, beginning with the 
imprisonment of Guzmán. Peru’s employment of its coercive agents resulted in the decisive 
victory of the government and military over the PCP-SL. Marc Chernick accounts that, “Since 
the end of the Cold War, few internal conflicts have ended so decisively with one side victorious 
and the other defeated.”344  
After the decisive victory against the Shining Path, Fujimori fed off of the fear from 
terrorism, allowing him to practice his authoritarian behavior and discredit any political 
opposition for ten years. From 1990 to 2000, Fujimori “blocked investigations into accounts of 
human rights abuses perpetuated by the state’s security forces during their counterinsurgency 
efforts as well as inquiries into his own complicity in authorizing anti-terror operations that 
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involved extrajudicial killings and massacres.”345 Fujimori avoided all future accountability by 
giving amnesty to all state authorities for any human rights violations in June 1995.346 Only until 
Fujimori resigned from his presidential role, by escaping to Japan because of a corruption 
scandal, could Peru address the legacy of the consequences of its internal war.347  
 
Transitional Justice in Peru 
 With the removal of Fujimori, Peru could completely address the internal conflict without 
the limitations from the corrupt administration. Interim president Valentín Paniagua made 
profound progress towards exploring transitional justice and bringing the state out of a regime 
rooted in impunity and corrupt practices. Both politicians in opposition against Fujimori and 
human rights organizations strongly encouraged the efforts towards combatting impunity from 
the conflict and Fujimori’s regime. Peruvian and international nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) were pivotal in their advocacy for undertaking accountability and truth concerns. Such 
organizations included the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH) and the Asociación 
Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detendios, y Desparecidos del Perú (ANFASEP).348 
Like the Madres de Plazo de Mayo in Argentina, ANFASEP composed of mothers of the 
disappeared. Beginning with a Quechua-speaking peasant, ANFASEP quickly transformed into 
one of the principal NGOs in Peru advocating for justice from the conflict.349 Under President 
Toledo, all accountability concerns would be holistically approached.  
Since the Shining Path is a terrorist organization, many Peruvians felt “that the concept of 
reconciliation, so central to transitional justice, is inappropriate for their country: one does not 	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reconcile with terrorists.”350 How can an individual possibly forgive someone who engaged in 
acts of terror in their communities with a simple apology? As examined in Chapter Three, 
reconciliation is a process, not a means to an end. Reconciliation efforts by transitional justice 
measures do not guarantee that there will, or should, be “forgiveness.” Therefore, engaging in 
transitional justice measures is extremely critical for building a collective future post-conflict. In 
addition to exploring restorative justice options, Peru engaged in retributive justice practices to 
showcase and provide accountability for the human rights abuses both the PCP-SL and the 
Peruvian military engaged in throughout the two decades of conflict. Peru explored all these 
measures to understand the conditions in which the Shining Path emerged and addressed the 
“legacies of a counterinsurgency strategy that imperiled the most marginalized—poor, rural, 
Quechua-speaking, indigenous Peruvians.”351 The upcoming sections briefly summarize Peru’s 
exploration of different transitional justice options as the country used to complete their 
“transitional justice toolkit.”  
 
Truth and Justice Reconciliation Commission 
 Peru’s truth commission, the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) was one of 
the first measures completed post Fujimori after human rights NGOs extensively pressured an 
inquiry in learning about the atrocities. Overall, the CVR was extremely successful in terms of 
its thoroughness. Priscilla Haynor, founder of the International Center for Transitional Justice, 
regards the CVR as one the top five comprehensive truth commissions completed thus far.352 
Under the mandate the commission was to ideally “identify those responsible, elaborate 
proposals for reparations of victims and their families, and recommend preventive and follow-up 	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measures to implement its recommendations.”353 In order to achieve this mandate, the CVR 
collected testimonies and conducted public hearings of a variety of people including incarcerated 
terrorists, political leaders, families of the disappeared, military commanders, and more.354 
 The legacy of the CVR provided a wealth of information with thorough accounts of the 
conflict. Its final report composed of nine volumes, detailing atrocities from both sides. Contrary 
to a former popular opinion by human rights activists, the CVR discovered that most of the 
violence was in fact committed by PCP-SL rebels over the government. Additionally, the 
commission discovered that 75 percent of the victims composed of indigenous people, stressing 
the role that racism and discrimination played in the conflict. These findings directly contributed 
to the CVR’s recommendations for both reparations and future justice measures.  
However, the CVR did not come without controversy. Those who opposed the 
commission from its conception claimed that it favored the terrorists, but the commission soon 
proved that it presented the most accurate account possible from the conflict, outlying atrocities 
from both sides. Two years after the end of the truth commission, members of the commission 
received death threats. It is understood that this was “in reaction to the effectiveness of the 
report, and the fact that criminal prosecutions recommended by the commission were then 
beginning to make progress in the courts.”355 While both the conservative political class and 
members of the Shining Path regard the TRC final report with disdain, “the relatives of victims 
and human rights defenders are unrelenting in their efforts. The final report has become a crucial 
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platform for the human rights movement, and a historical accusation against those that exclude 
and are violent.”356  
 
Retributive Justice Post-Conflict  
As described above, the CVR offered critical information for the Peruvian judicial system 
in giving a confidential report for the courts to use. With the access to both the accounts from the 
CVR and this confidential document, the Peruvian judiciary gathered enough material to 
prosecute and convict President Fujimori and other key authorities responsible for atrocities. 
After leaving Japan for a trip to Chile, Fujimori was extradited back to Peru in 2005 with an 
international arrest warrant. The former president ended up being convicted in 2009 for both his 
corruption during his administration and his role in grave human rights violations.357 Today, 
Guzmán remains behind bars since his initial capture. Besides successfully prosecuting these 
violators of human rights, Peru had to face an additional component in its transitional justice 
process. Throughout the 1990s, Peru unjustly tried thousands of individuals for terrorism in its 
military courts.358 These military courts were arbitrary and directly violated appropriate 
conditions of due process. Accordingly, retributive justice in Peru fell into three categories: the 
need for retrial for these alleged terrorists, ensuring accountability of members of the armed 
forces, and the indictment of Fujimori.  
Both during the conflict itself and immediately following the cessation of violence, 
military courts tried roughly 2,000 perceived terrorists in military courts. Peru’s Constitutional 
Court later declared that these trials under Fujimori antiterrorism legislation were explicitly 
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unconstitutional and thus granted a retrial to any prisoners who filed for a new trial.359 Among 
them was Guzmán, which triggered emotional protests. During the initial military tribunals, 
innocent individuals were imprisoned and as a result, about 100 individuals were given 
pardons.360 However, these pardons did not come without extreme controversy. While some were 
innocent, guilty members of the Shining Path will likely never be held accountable for their 
actions “because they either eluded capture or collaborated with security forces in exchange for 
their freedom (especially after the 1992 Repentance Law).”361  
While searching communities for Shining Path perpetrators is extremely difficult, holding 
members of the armed forces was more achievable. The Inter-American Court’s decision in 
Barrios Altos nullified Fujimori’s 1995 amnesty laws which gave impunity to all human rights 
violations committed by governmental forces. Since the repeal of amnesty, various military 
officials have been brought to justice. For example, Julio Salazar Monroe, the head of military 
intelligence, was sentenced for his involvement in organizing the Grupo Colina death squad and 
ordering the La Cuenta massacre.362 While there has been progress in prosecutions, justice has 
been severely limited as, “State crimes that fit the much more widespread patterns of human 
rights abuses—that is, crimes committed by the armed forces in the 1980s in the poor, rural 
district of Ayacucho against marginalized sectors of the population—have resulted in a mere 
handful of cases and even fewer convictions.”363 Here, the CVR’s hopefulness with justice has 
fallen short. 
 The last category of retributive justice, the arrest of Fujimori follows the pattern of 
prosecuting former heads of state in Latin America. Fujimori’s arrest resembles cases like i 	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Argentina with military junta leaders and in Chile with Augusto Pinochet. After being arrested, 
Fujimori was found guilty “of corruption, abuse of authority, and authorizing unlawful search 
and seizure, kidnapping, assault and aggravated homicide carried out by Grupo Colina.”364 For 
these crimes, Fujimori faces 25 years in prison. His imprisonment brought the once thought 
impossible to become possible. 
 
Reparations and Restorative Justice in Peru 
 After the end of the conflict, Peru demonstrated a willingness to provide reparations for 
victims who experienced some of the worst hardships both during and after the years of violence. 
However, efforts to mediate these hardships have taken an understandably substantial amount of 
time. Coupled with reparation programs being both economically and politically challenging, 
these programs need to address Peru’s history of marginalizing the indigenous population in the 
country as well as make considerable efforts to overcome widespread discrimination.365 Despite 
Peru’s alleged commitment for implementing these programs, time progresses and victims are 
left waiting, “even after having suffered a serious violation sometimes twenty or more years ago 
and having navigated the long victim-registration process to finally achieve some recognition as 
right bearers.”366 Largely, the difficulty to carry through with these recommendations in full form 
is indicative of the Peruvian elites’ hesitance with recognizing their responsibility in the 
conflict’s violations against the indigenous population and the conditions evident beforehand.367 
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 With the completion of the CVR’s findings in 2003, the CVR produced a comprehensive 
reparation plan for the Peruvian government. Plan Integral de Repraciones, or the 
Comprehensive Reparations Plan (PIR) “envisions a variety of reparations, including programs 
focused on health, education, symbolic, individual, and collective benefits, as well as those 
intended to restore the rights of citizens.”368 After the truth commission, the Registro Único de 
Víctimas (RUV) was created to develop an official registry of victims deserving reparation. In 
order to qualify for reparation, victims must undergo a painful process of testifying their 
hardships they experienced during the conflict.369 Once identified, victims must wait for their 
appropriate compensation. Ultimately, the Reparations Council has no authority to actually carry 
out the program, thus leaving the implementation program in the hands of the governmental 
office: the Comisión  Multisectoral de Alto Nivel (CMAN). The CVR anticipated that these plans 
would be implemented immediately, but various factors have impeded with full application.   
 Actually implementing these programs has become more convoluted throughout the 
years. As of 2013, out of the 5,697 communities needing reparation, CMAN has implemented 
reparation projects in roughly only 1,946 communities.370 These projects aim to prove basic 
infrastructure such as “roads, potable water sources, community and health centers, and the 
support for the raising of livestock and fish.”371 However, these collective projects come with 
challenges. There is no explicit indication that these are efforts to mediate the political violence 
and “Hundreds of thousands of people live in these communities, and most are unaware that the 
reparation projects in their communities serve any reparative purpose.”372 The collective 
programs have served as a political purpose, as Garcia once used images from the improvements 	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for public relations purposes. Root criticizes that since Garcia was president during the most 
violent years his use of these programs to promote his popularity “is an indicator of how 
transitional justice processes can be misappropriated.”373 
 The CVR additionally recommended that Peru needed to engage in memorialization 
efforts. Implementing these programs has spurred significant debate, as Peru has not yet formed 
a cohesive policy concerning memorialization. While monuments have sprouted throughout the 
country, these efforts are only localized efforts. One private memorial is the “El Ojo que Llora” 
(The Eye that Cries) in Lima.374 Civil society organizations have proposed for the establishment 
of a National Museum of Memory. Much debate over the inclusion of certain exhibitions has 
spurred contested debate throughout Peru. Where human rights violations occurred, some 
regional governments have decided to rename the places to honor those who experienced the 
atrocity.375 Since the government does not have a unified stance on memorialization, it is 
currently dependent on individual communities. 
Actually engaging in a successful reparations program has proven to be an extremely 
difficult process as seen in Peru. Critics remain extremely disappointed with Peru’s failure to 
give out individual monetary compensation as well as failing to fully address promises of 
improving education and health care. While there has been discouragement, Peru’s reparation 
efforts, though gradual, are making some necessary progress. While not initially suggested by the 
PIR, several organizations have been working towards identifying remains of the victims of 
enforced disappearances in order to provide closure for families searching for their loved ones. 
From 2002 to 2012 alone, “the remains of 2,109 victims were recovered, of which 1,074 were 
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identified and returned to their families.”376 Despite not being all-encompassing, these efforts are 
certainly commendable.  
 
Moving Forward 
 Peru’s transitional justice efforts have taken the first critical steps in addressing the 
wounds from its internal conflict. While these initial efforts have certainly not been perfect and 
at times are rather flawed and contested, these steps are momentous nonetheless. Peru’s 
experience with transitional justice indicates that while the process of implementing justice 
practices in post-conflict situations is an extremely long and arduous journey, it proves to be a 
worthwhile one. The idealized complete version of reconciliation is likely impossible in Peru 
largely because of the confusion and because of the fact that that the Shining Path was 
fundamentally a terrorist group. The process of discerning who could receive reparation sheds 
light on the level of gravity behind these decisions. Early on, the RUV determined that “any 
individual in any way affiliated with a subversive organization from being identified as a victim 
in the RUV, even in cases where the state was found responsible for raping, torturing, or 
extrajudicial executing that individual” would not be granted reparation.377 If a Shining Path 
member accidently benefited from the RUV, public infuriation could jeopardize the future of all 
reparation programs in Peru.378 The extreme hostile nature of the insurgency group further 
complicates the way in which Peru can heal from the conflict. Despite this confusion, the conflict 
between the PCP-SL causes mostly the poor indigenous suffering, and these violations need to 
be addressed.  
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Reparation and restorative justice measures have encompassed significant efforts 
virtually impossible under Fujimori, bringing Peru closer towards bridging the gap between the 
“Two Perus.” Both the CVR and Peru’s retributive justice experience suggest that battling 
cultures of impunity from conflict is possible, although a delicate process. ICTJ reiterates, 
“Nevertheless, the process of fully acknowledging society’s responsibility for its part in 
violations, as well as overcoming the historical marginalization of vast numbers of its society, 
will require additional time and effort.”379 Transitional justice and combatting impunity is overall 
a learning process that will take time. Policymakers in other states in the future can use Peru’s 
transitional justice experience as a framework for potential methods of battling impunity post-
conflict in their own respective situations.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The individual ways that the case studies all dealt with their respective insurgencies and 
post-conflict transitions offer various lessons for the future. We can learn both how we tackle 
insurgencies and terrorism as well as the restrictions states and societies may face in addressing 
prevailing impunity from conflict while dealing with festering wounds from survivors. Taking 
time and discerning from these lessons is particularly critical as Chapter One indicates that the 
international community is no longer experiencing the threat of war on an interstate level, that is, 
huge state forces fighting each other, but more so on an intrastate level. Non-state actors such as 
insurgency organizations are increasingly threatening a state’s power by declaring armed 
rebellions. Due to the fact that most of these insurgencies are “People’s Wars” and apply Mao’s 
method of protracted warfare, the threats of these rebellions are extremely pressing as they are 
enduring, long-lasting conflicts. 
 We certainly live in an age of terrorism with indiscriminate attacks posing a threat at any 
moment. 2016 will mark the fifteenth year anniversary since 9/11, and terrorism still poses a 
very tangible threat. The way in which states have battled their own terrorist threats of 
insurgencies presents various lessons for the international community in how to handle situations 
of terror, whether it is on the global scale or in individual respective states. While some form of 
response against terrorism is required, responses can potentially result in disturbing 
consequences. Donnelly claims that our collective fight against terrorism, whether it is a global 
or specifically state threat, has become, “a crusade against evil to be pursued without too much 
concern for the ordinary restraints of law and conventional limits on the use of force.”380 During 
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these fights against terrorism, security forces blur the lines between just and unjust behavior in 
war as campaigns to combat terrorism directly end up targeting civilians, since it is so difficult to 
distinguish between innocent civilians and insurgents. Because of these campaigns, “human 
rights are the price exacted not just from terrorists but from peaceful political opponents, 
members of groups that are feared or despised, and ordinary individuals accidentally or 
arbitrarily caught up in the security apparatus.”381 Particularly concerning is the way unarmed, 
defenseless civilians become caught in the midst of the conflict between armed forces. 
Subsequently, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics efforts need to delicately respond 
to these situations in ways that end the threat but avoid engaging in brutal behaviors that often 
significantly surpass the level of violence that they fight.  
 The case studies’ respective counterinsurgency strategies of fighting insurgent threat 
demonstrate potential avenues in the fight against terrorism. Nepal represents the most peculiar 
situation because after attempting to defeat the CPN-M, the state abandoned its efforts when it 
became evident that the Maoists gained considerable popularity in the country and the fight 
would be more difficult. CPN-M abandoning its resort to violence and transitioning towards a 
political party participating in elections is an especially unique situation. Unlike Nepal, which 
ended in a peace agreement between the non-state and state actors, both Peru and Sri Lanka 
defeated their insurgencies with a complete military victory and avoided negotiations between 
the parties post-conflict. The ways that Peru and Sri Lanka both respectfully fought their 
insurgency threats of the PCP-SL and the LTTE offer warnings against resorting to complete 
indiscriminate force in order to regain a monopoly of violence. While Peru successfully 
suppressed the PCP-SL’s threat without surpassing the amount of atrocities the Shining Path 
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engaged in, as the CVR report demonstrates, the Peruvian solution of complete military 
suppression should not be the answer for other states. In fact, if other states try to replicate Peru’s 
tactics of the autoglope and other practices, it could potentially escalate to a higher scale of 
violations of human rights. Sri Lanka represents such a situation. The “Sri Lanka Option” of 
using unforgiving military force, resulted in abuse on a massive scale with the indiscriminate 
attacks on “No-fire zones” where innocent civilians sought refuge. Perhaps if the Maoists in 
Nepal were not as popular, the Nepalese security forces may have engaged in similar behaviors 
as Sri Lanka and Peru, but tremendous support and popularity prevented this reaction. 
 No matter how an intrastate conflict ends, either by a peaceful agreement or a military 
victory, internal conflicts leave societies with a myriad of unanswered questions. One of the 
biggest issues that this thesis discerns is the degree that post-conflict can address these questions. 
As Chapter Two discusses, there is a tendency of governments to avoid answering these 
questions at all and instead these governments practice denial, ensuring impunity from the 
conflict directly transitions into the succeeding government. Because of this tendency, it has 
been commonplace that oftentimes post-conflict societies will actively avoid addressing any of 
the “wounds” from the past. Consequently, transitional justice options are severely limited based 
on the political context, which poses an abundance of problems for the survivors who have gone 
through tremendous suffering and seek answers.  
 However as Kathryn Sikkink stresses, there has been a “Justice Cascade” occurring in the 
past two decades in global politics. For some reason, former politicians no longer enjoy their 
limitless impunity and both international and domestic courts are holding them responsible for 
their human rights violations. However, in order for this to happen, political leaders from conflict 
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or authoritarian administrations need to either step down or be replaced in a transitional election 
of some form. If they remain in power, it directly blocks any holistic investigation efforts.  
Largely, international and national NGOs have played an instrumental role in challenging 
a state’s human rights abuses by directly challenging these pervasive impunity and denial 
practices. Collective and organized denial creates extreme “barriers to finding out what actually 
happened…especially as government leaders go to great lengths to stonewall and cover up 
human rights abuses while deploying a sharply crafted spin.”382 Because governments are so 
determined to cover up atrocities, international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch have published reports exposing these crimes to the international community with 
direct evidence. By publishing these reports, these groups create pressure for the governments to 
appease demands, as they may be “ashamed” by the publicized findings. Other international 
groups such as the Center for Transitional Justice helps aid transitioning countries in post-
conflict settings. Independent national human rights groups have also emerged as seen in Peru, 
wherein they may call for answers to find disappeared family members or advocate for specific 
reparation programs that communities and victims need. In Peru, the CVR benefited 
tremendously from the work of human rights groups like the organization, Coordinadora 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos.383 While instrumental, the capabilities of these groups are 
severely limited when leaders remain in power. 
When states finally embark on transitional justice measures, a number of issues surface. 
Transitioning societies must wrestle with the extent that they should engage in retributive justice 
program and prosecute former officials and rebel leaders. With justice comes the dilemma of 
having either too much justice or not enough. States need to pay attention to the potential that at 	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some point there may be too much justice, as efforts may manifest into a form of revenge. While 
reparations programs for victims help alleviate some of the “wounds” they suffer from, 
reparations also pose the danger that victims may feel that reparations represent “blood money” 
or that they put a price on their suffering. Discovering the “truth” with truth commissions is a 
shaky ground as it creates the potential of granting amnesties for a “complete truth” as seen in 
the South African Commission. Furthermore, there are concerns that the findings may not be 
wholly accurate and instead plagued with bias. Memory and memorization also spurns debates 
over “what” gets remembered and how future generations will learn about the past. Further, these 
practices may pave the road for disappointment, as survivor’s specific demands may not be met 
or fall short.  
As seen in the case studies, transitional justice is a shaky ground. An inherent concern 
with these particular post-conflict situations is that the situations are tremendously sensitive. 
Conventional concepts of full “Reconciliation” is certainly off the table as no one can ask 
someone to actually forgive a terrorist, or forgive the state for its use of state terrorism tactics. 
Despite this, as I mention at the end of Chapter 3, reconciliation is ultimately a process, not a 
goal. Complete reconciliation will likely never occur, but it is crucial to work towards engaging 
in practices that allow former enemies to coexist together in the same state, though they may not 
coexist perfectly.  
Peru’s use of its “transitional justice toolkit” proves that it is worthwhile to engage in a 
variety of measures. Despite being worthwhile, Peru still faced a plethora of challenges. For 
instance, while greatly successful, the CVR spurred divide, particularly in the disagreements 
with former Shining Path rebels and Conservatives in the Peruvian government as they initially 
adamantly denied some of the testimonies being accurate. Tensions even escalated to the point 
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that members of the commission received death threats. Though commission members received 
death threats, it reveals how effective the facts found in the truth commission ended up being. In 
addition to providing evidence, the CVR put together a comprehensive reparation plan, but 
unfortunately, these suggestions have not yet been implemented in full force and to an extent 
cannot possibly fulfill the promises due to monetary constraints.  
Sri Lanka and Nepal have had limited experience with transitional justice, largely 
contributed to their respective political contexts. If they engage in transitional justice practices, 
both can potentially benefit significantly. If Nepal follows through with its truth commission, the 
commission could provide necessary recommendations for the full implementation of Nepal’s 
reparation programs, giving needed services for the lower castes, which experienced the most 
violations during the conflict. While it is important for truth commission possess an unbiased 
board, with human rights groups continuing to declare the amendment of Nepalese officials (now 
representing both former government officials and CPN-M rebels) possibly receiving amnesty 
for the truth commission, this might unnecessarily prolong the truth process, impeding with the 
closure process of families of disappeared as they still have unanswered questions. It is evident 
that while the international community scorns Nepal’s practices of impunity as seen with the 
United Kingdom’s arrest of Kumar Lama in 2013, it is unlikely that Nepal will ever engage in 
retributive justice. For Sri Lanka, the tides certainly are turning with January’s election of 
President Siriensa. While Siriensa has been implementing change post-Rajapaksa as he appears 
to be challenging former governmental practices, it remains unclear the actual extent that 
Siriensa will address accountability from the past with Siriensa’s recent refusal to have the UN 
conduct an investigation on the alleged war crimes from the conflict. While a domestic inquiry is 
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monumental in light of Rajapaksa’s insistence to deny the past, it poses a concern of how 
unbiased the inquiry will actually be since it may potentially serve as a cover-up for war crimes.  
Overall, transitional justice is a worthwhile process. It can directly aid post-conflict 
societies to form a respect for trust in the new government, leading towards a path of recovery.  
Ultimately it is a process that takes time. It is not going to be easy, as societies have to grapple 
with a variety of issues surfacing with each option. Nevertheless appropriate transitional justice 
practices can reap long-lasting benefits for recovering nation-states. Transitional justice can 
directly address the root causes that inspired the conflict, and work towards eliminating the threat 
of a reemergence of violence.  
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